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I. Introduction 
 
By now, it is no secret to the global community that the many African countries 
lag far behind the rest of the world in terms of poverty rates, life expectancy, standard of 
living, per capita income, health, GDP and economic growth.  Table 1 presents some 
statistical indicators that show the Sub-Saharan African region suffers from amongst 
 other things, a short life expectancy, high infant mortality rate and a low per capita 
Table 1: Selected Health and Economic Indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa, 2003 
 
Source: World Development Indicators  
income relative to the rest of the world. In recent years Africa, a region so often tragically  
ignored, has been receiving more attention.  The Jubilee 2000 campaign as well as many 
other NGOs including Make Poverty History and the One Campaign, and even the rock 
singer Bono have drawn more attention to the situation of many African countries by 
calling for, among other things, the cancellation of third world debt.  This question of 
debt relief also received heavy attention at the G8 summit in July of 2005, where the 
leaders of the G8 nations pledged to cancel the debt in 18 of the world’s highly indebted 
poor countries (HIPCs).  As a result of this pledge, and the willingness of the G8 
countries to provide the necessary funds to the IMF and World Bank to grant 100 percent 
debt relief to eligible countries, in December of 2005 the IMF and World Bank 
announced the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).  According to the IMF, the 
MDRI will provide US $3.3 billion worth of debt relief to 19 of the world’s poorest 
countries (14 of them located in sub-Saharan Africa), allowing them to “increase 
spending in priority areas to reduce poverty, promote growth, and to make progress 
towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals” (IMF, 2005a). Clearly, the 
question of debt relief is one that is very current and has a number of economic as well as 
geopolitical implications. 
Population, Total 704.7 million 
Life Expectancy (years) 45.6 
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births) 101.0 
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of pop. 15-49) 6.7 
GNI per capita, (current US $) 510 
GDP growth (annual %) 4.3 
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 The countries of sub-Saharan Africa, however, face not only a large stock of 
external debt and a difficult economic situation but also a major health crisis in the form 
of an AIDS epidemic.  According to UNAIDS statistics, in 2004, 25.4 million of the 
world’s 39.4 million people living with AIDS were in sub-Saharan African countries.  
The severity of this health crisis is such that it has potentially devastating economic 
effects.  Sachs (2005) regards the AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa as a virtual 
economic catastrophe with negative implications for businesses, human capital 
accumulation, worker productivity, foreign investment and soaring health care costs.  
Clearly, much like high levels of debt stock and sub-Saharan African poverty, the 
problem of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa is one that is of great importance.  Both AIDS 
and high levels of debt are generally perceived to have deleterious effects on a country’s 
overall economic performance.  Whereas some perceive HIV/AIDS as a hindrance to 
economic growth, other groups such as the NGO Oxfam, take the stance that 
unsustainable levels of debt impede progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS.  Thus, many 
see a strong link between debt relief, HIV/AIDS and a country’s economic growth and 
performance.   
Therefore, this paper will undertake an economic analysis of the relationship 
between HIV/AIDS, debt relief and economic growth in Africa.  In essence, the central 
question to be addressed is: Does debt relief have a significant impact on AIDS reduction 
and economic growth?  The paper will proceed by first analyzing the HIPC Initiative, the 
framework and process through which highly indebted poor countries receive debt relief.  
Next, the relevant economic issues surrounding HIV/AIDS will be examined.  This 
section will include the potential negative effects of HIV/AIDS on a nation’s economy, as 
well as a discussion of the policy issues surrounding HIV/AIDS.  Finally, case studies of 
three countries eligible for debt relief under the HIPC and MDRI (Burkina Faso, Ghana 
and Uganda) will be undertaken.  The case studies will examine how each country plans 
to use resources freed up by debt relief to fight HIV/AIDS, and the economic 
implications of each strategy. The economic analysis of each country’s strategy to fight 
HIV/AIDS and how it plays in to economic growth will necessarily be quite in depth and 
will have to address many issues, including the four central issues of: 1) The impact of 
HIV/AIDS on the size, composition, and productivity of the labor force (i.e. questions of 
human capital.) 2) The role that HIV/AIDS related medical expenditures play and how 
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these expenditures are financed. 3) The opportunity costs of fighting HIV/AIDS (e.g. 
Decreasing levels of savings or capital investment to finance the fight against HIVAIDS, 
or choosing to use debt relief to fight HIV/AIDS as opposed to promoting other pro-poor 
expenditures).  4) How the country’s strategy to fight HIV/AIDS harmonizes with their 
overall strategy for growth.  The economic analysis will also follow the logic of a Cobb-
Douglas production function and will try to determine the effects that each country’s 
strategy in combating HIV/AIDS will have on labor productivity and capital, and 
consequently on growth.  By doing a careful economic analysis of each country’s 
strategy, conclusions can be reached about how a country can best use debt relief to 
combat HIV/AIDS and promote economic growth and poverty reduction. 
II. Debt Relief:  The HIPC Initiative 
Before embarking on an analysis of the HIPC Initiative, it is perhaps necessary to 
discuss the economic theory surrounding debt relief.  High levels of debt are generally 
perceived to be harmful due to the “debt overhang” hypothesis (Krugman, 1988). 
Following this debt overhang hypothesis, excessive debt stocks deter foreign investment 
and consequently harm growth.  The debt overhang hypothesis may not be much of a 
factor for the countries eligible for the HIPC initiative mainly because foreign investment 
was never much of a factor for them in the first place (Gautam, 2003).  In their case, high 
levels of debt payment are seen as crowding out other public, social and capital 
expenditures that would increase growth and reduce poverty.  There is, however, debate 
as to whether debt relief is an effective and efficient use of aid.  Bird and Milne (2003) 
suggest that debt relief may not be economically efficient or effective, especially if debt 
relief crowds out other forms of aid.  Others also do not view debt relief as the “magic 
bullet” cure that some NGOs and economists make it out to be. Some suggest that 
alternatives such as increased aid would be a more effective strategy than debt relief 
(Arslanalp and Henry, 2004).   Past instances of debt relief are also cited as cycles of 
irresponsible governance on the part of debtor nations and irresponsible lending on the 
part of creditor nations (Easterly, 2001).  While debt relief has achieved popular public 
support, there is still disagreement as to how effective it actually is.  It is generally 
accepted that debt relief alone is not enough.  Because many countries with a high stock 
of debt suffer from weak governance, corruption, and poor economic policy, reforms are 
necessary to ensure that resources made available from debt relief are used efficiently.    
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Starting in the late 1980s, creditor nations as well as the World Bank and the IMF 
undertook a series of measures to ease the burden on countries struggling with debt.  As 
Gautam (2003) indicates, the primary measure undertake was the Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP), designed to help countries reform policies and cope with short-term 
problems.  However, for a variety of reasons, these measures did not achieve their 
projected goals, and in the mid 1990s increasing pressure to provide debt relief arose 
from NGOs, debtor nations, and even The Pope due to the concern that debt had reached 
levels in many countries where it was handicapping growth and efforts to reduce poverty.    
As a result of this pressure, the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative 
was launched in September 1996 as a joint initiative between the IMF and the World 
Bank.  The Initiative is considered a new concept because it represents the first time 
multilateral debt has become eligible for forgiveness. In 1999, the Enhanced HIPC 
initiative was launched in response to criticism that the original Initiative was too slow 
and too limited in providing relief.   
In essence, the HIPC Initiative consists of 2 stages.  In the first stage, a country 
must establish a track record of economic reforms in areas such as poverty reduction, 
stabilization, public sector reforms, health, and education.  After these three years of 
reforms a country has reached the end of the first phase and is at the “decision point.”  It 
is at this point where the decision is made as to whether a country’s debt is sustainable.  
If the debt is deemed to be unsustainable, the country begins to receive some debt relief, 
and it begins to undergo even more reforms in areas such as macro-economic policy, that 
will help reduce poverty.  It is also at this point that a country must create its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP.)  At the end of the Initiative process, countries are at 
the “completion point” and receive even more debt relief.  Reaching the completion point 
has become more important with the implementation of the MDRI in December of 2005, 
as reaching the completion point of the HIPC Initiative is the criteria for a country to 
receive 100 % debt forgiveness.   
Table 2 presents the framework of both the original and Enhanced HIPC 
Initiatives. 
 
Table 2: The Original and Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
Element Original HIPC Enhanced HIPC 
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Stated objectives To bring the country’s debt down to 
sustainable levels, subject to 
satisfactory policy performance 
Maintains the original focus to 
remove the debt overhang and 
provide a permanent exit from 
rescheduling, plus free up resources 
for higher social spending aimed at 
poverty reduction to the extent that 
cash debt-service payments are 
reduced 
Qualification criteria IDA-only countries (poverty) 
Unsustainable level of debt after full 
use of traditional mechanisms Strong 
record of policy performance  
Same. Applied retroactively to 
include countries already past 
decision or completion points under 
the original framework 
Debt sustainability Guiding principle: Target overall 
debt sustainability  
to provide a durable exit strategy 
from the rescheduling process. 
Principle for change: Provide a clear 
exit from unsustainable debt burden 
to remove the debt overhang and 
provide an appropriate cushion 
against exogenous shocks 
Indicators: Targets Target range for main indicator:  
NPV debt-to-exports: 200–250% 
NPV debt-to-revenue: 280% with 
export/GDP: 40%;  
revenue/GDP: 20%  
Uniform application of single target:  
NPV debt-to-exports: 150% 
NPV debt-to-revenue: 250% with 
export/GDP: 30%; revenue/GDP: 
15% 
Calculation of relief Fixed at completion point, based on 
projections of debt indicator for 
completion point 
Fixed at decision point, using actual 
data on NPV debt for year prior to 
decision point and 3-year average for 
exports 
Time of relief delivery Completion point (CP), irrevocable 
commitment  
 
Decision point: on an annual basis, 
interim relief is bulk  
of anticipated post-CP relief, it is 
irrevocable  
Forward-looking assessments Debt sustainability analysis to project 
profile of key debt indicators 
Same 
Performance criteria Guiding principle: Action only after 
the debtor has shown, through a track 
record, the ability to put to good use 
whatever relief is provided  
Principle for change: To strengthen 
the incentives for debtor countries to 
adopt strong programs of adjustment 
and reform  
For decision point 3-year track record of 
macroeconomic stability and policy 
reform  
Same plus interim or full PRSP 
For completion point Further 3-year track record of 
macroeconomic stability  
and policy reform  
 
Maintenance of macroeconomic 
stability 
Completion of PRSP, plus one-year 
PRSP implementation  
for E-HIPC  
Performance benchmarks for 
structural and social reforms  
Interim period 3 years  
 
Flexible, with the introduction of 
floating CP 
Creditor participation Guiding principle: Comprehensive 
debt relief action: coordinated among 
all creditors involved with broad  
and equitable participation  
New external finance to be on 
appropriately concessional terms  
Principle for change: Same plus debt 
relief should be additional to 
reinforce the wider tools of the 
international community to promote 
sustainable development and poverty 
reduction  
 Source: Gautam, Madhur.  Debt Relief for the Poorest: An OED Review of the HIPC Initiative.   
 Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003, 12. 
 
 
A few points are worth noting in considering Table 2.  First of all, it is clear that 
the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, while preserving much of the framework of the Original 
HIPC Initiative, is nevertheless different both in its structure and in its goals. While the 
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Enhanced HIPC Initiative is a more flexible strategy in terms of eligibility and process 
requirement, it is also decidedly more ambitious in terms of its goals.  Mijumbi (2001) 
describes the crucial features of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative as reduction in the Net 
Present Value of Debt to Export ratio from 200-250% to 150%, quicker delivery of debt 
relief beginning not at completion point but at the decision point, a floating completion 
point as opposed to a fixed 3 year period between decision and completion point, and the 
linking of debt relief and poverty reduction.  This final point concerning the link between 
debt relief and poverty reduction represents a major change in the HIPC Initiative.  In 
essence, as Table 2 indicates, in order to reach a decision point under the Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative, a country must not only maintain a 3 year track record of macroeconomic 
stability and policy reform, it must formulate a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
as well.  Furthermore, in order to reach the completion point, a country must have put its 
PRSP to work for at least one year.  The addition of the requirement of a PRSP 
essentially adds a whole new dimension to the HIPC Initiative.  Whereas the Original 
HIPC Initiative had the sole objective of debt sustainability, the Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative with the introduction of the PRSP added the goal of poverty reduction to the 
process.  The result of this change is that in order for a country to qualify for the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative, it is crucial for that country to formulate a PRSP.  In essence, 
the introduction of the PRSP requirement is aimed at making sure resources made 
available by debt relief go towards “pro poor spending.”  In other words, towards 
programs and social expenditures such as health care, education and infrastructure that 
will directly benefit the poor in a country.  Increased spending to fight HIV/AIDS falls 
under the category of “pro poor spending” and thus, it is important to understand the 
nature of the PRSP approach.  Furthermore, the case studies of each country will draw on 
each country’s strategy to use debt relief to combat HIV/AIDS as described in their 
respective PRSPs.  
The genesis of the PRSP is significant and represents a real fundamental shift in 
the ideology and workings of the IMF and World Bank  (Booth, 2003).  Furthermore, the 
PRSP has taken center stage in the arena of debt relief and aid, as even several European 
countries have based their bilateral aid decisions on a country’s PRSP (Dijkstra, 2005).  
The aim of the PRSP approach is to “describe a country's macroeconomic, structural and 
social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated 
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external financing needs” (World Bank, 2005). The PRSP approach, in essence, 
recognizes that reducing poverty will require different things for different countries.  
Thus, it enables a country to tailor a strategy to its own specific needs, following a 
few guiding principles. The IMF lays out five principles that should guide a country’s 
PRSP formulation.  The five principles are: 
1) Country Driven- A PRSP should be country specific.  It should be 
formulated by a country itself, using broad based participation involving both 
government and civil society. 
2) Results Oriented- A PRSP should have a firm grasp on the determinants of 
poverty within a country, and should set medium and long term goals for 
poverty reduction which can be tracked using specific indicators. 
3) Comprehensive- Poverty is multidimensional.  As such, a PRSP should 
include institutional, structural and sectoral reforms.  Furthermore, sustained 
reductions in poverty require economic growth and thus sound 
macroeconomic policy that fosters growth is necessary. 
4) Partnerships- Better coordination between governments and donors is 
necessary. 
5) Long Term Perspective- Poverty reduction is a long-term process that 
requires institutional change and improved governance and accountability. 
While these five principles result in specific strategies that vary a great deal from 
country to country, there are some common elements shared by virtually each country’s 
PRSP.  First of all, based on these five principles, countries generally formulate PRSPs 
that rest on four or five pillars, and center their strategies around goals such as broad 
based or “pro-poor” economic growth which includes macroeconomic policy, good 
governance, increased investment in social programs such as health and education, and 
increased social protection (Craig and Porter, 2003).  For example, the PRSP of Burkina 
Faso focuses on: accelerating equity-based growth, guaranteeing that the poor have 
access to basic social services, expanding opportunities for employment and income-
generating activities for the poor, and promoting good governance (Burkina Faso, 2000). 
Gottshcalk (2005) identifies some further common elements of all PRSPs; the 
most important being quick and sustainable “pro poor” economic growth.  This type of 
sustained growth is perceived by all countries to be vital for poverty reduction. Pro-poor 
 10
economic growth requires increased human capital and economic and social 
infrastructure investment, fostering sound macroeconomic policy (mainly low inflation 
and balanced budgets), and institutional reforms.  In line with this goal of “pro poor” 
economic growth, countries have set target growth rates in their PRSPs, although these 
targets may be overly optimistic (Gottschalk, 2005).  Understandably, the PRSP approach 
places great importance on economic growth, but it recognizes that sustained growth can 
only occur if the needs of the poor are met through such things as increased educational 
and health care expenditures.  In essence, this type of approach seems to aim at 
increasing worker productivity through investment in human capital, as a means to 
increase growth.  More concretely, this could mean that a government’s PRSP could 
include increased expenditures to help finance medication for those living with 
HIV/AIDS.  Such expenditures could improve worker productivity, as a worker suffering 
from HIV/AIDS receiving treatment is less likely to miss days of work or suffer from 
decreased productivity due to ill health.   
The PRSP approach has been around for a little over five years.  While this has 
been time enough to allow several countries to formulate second-generation PRSPs, 
which are essentially updated and revised versions of their original PRSPs, it is too early 
to make a comprehensive assessment of the overall effectiveness of the approach at 
reducing poverty (Driscoll and Evans, 2005).  Nevertheless, some general evaluations of 
the process thus far can be made. 
   First of all, although it may be too early to make a substantial empirical assessment 
of whether the overall impact of the PRSPs is positive, a few positives have emerged 
from the PRSP approach.  These positives include an increase focus by the government 
on poverty, a civil society that is more engaged and more mobilized on the issue of 
poverty, and more attention to donor behavior (Driscoll and Evans, 2005).  In terms of 
increased government focus on poverty, the success has come in the form of poverty 
reduction plans that are more comprehensive than ever before, improvements in how 
poverty is monitored, a clear definition of where pro-poor expenditures fit into a 
government’s budget, and increased pro-poor expenditures.  Figure 2, affirms this point 
as poverty reducing expenditures have been increasing steadily since the implementation 
of the HIPC Initiative in 1999.   Poverty reducing expenditures have increased from 
US$5.9 billion in 1999 to US$10.8 billion in 2004 and are should increase to US$16.5 
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billion in 2007 (IMF, 2005b). 
 
Figure 2: Poverty-Reducing Expenditures and External Debt Service  
   (Weighted average, in percent of GDP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Source: International Monetary Fund.  “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative- 
 Status of Implementation.” Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2005. 
Table 3 presents the poverty reducing expenditures for Burkina Faso, Ghana, and 
Uganda, the three countries to be considered in case studies. 
Table 3: Poverty Reducing Expenditures in $US millions 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
est. 
2005 
proj. 
2006 
proj. 
2007 
proj. 
Burkina Faso          
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures 
113.8 99.1 109.4 174.1 218.5 296.3 336.7 350.4 367.9 
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures/Government 
Revenue (in %) 
29.6 31.8 35.3 42.0 38.7 42.0 44.5 41.1 38.8 
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures/GDP (in %) 
4.0 3.8 3.8 5.3 5.1 5.8 5.9 5.7 5.6 
Ghana          
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures 
344.8 189.2 236.3 276.1 483.3 676.2 855.2 980.5 1118.1 
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures/Government 
Revenue (in %) 
35.3 52.4 25.1 26.5 31.1 32.2 33.5 35.9 37.5 
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures/GDP (in %) 
4.4 7.2 4.5 4.5 6.3 7.6 8.1 8.3 8.7 
Uganda          
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures 
306.0 402.5 444.8 553.1 724.8 914.7 1000.2 1012.7 1028.3 
Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures/Government 
Revenue (in %) 
40.4 59.7 68.0 79.3 101.3 98.0 94.5 83.8 75.7 
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
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Poverty Reducing 
Expenditures/GDP (in %) 
5.3 7.1 7.7 9.7 12.3 12.4 11.9 11.0 10.3 
 Source: International Monetary Fund.  “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative- 
 Status of Implementation.” Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2005. 
Clearly, the HIPC Initiative has led to increased government focus on poverty, as is 
evidenced by increased pro-poor spending.  The HIPC Initiative has also led to increased 
civil society involvement, as governments formulate their respective PRSPs with the help 
of civil society.  This has led to a more mainstreamed and broader poverty reduction 
approach that has created new spaces for poverty policy debate on the domestic level as 
well as better systems to monitor poverty that may in turn lead to more effective poverty 
reduction strategies (Booth, 2003).  As a result of these positive aspects of the PRSP 
approach, a country is left with a specific development strategy over which it can claim 
ownership.   
 While there are positive aspects to the PRSP approach, the consensus is that it is 
far from perfect.  The PRSP approach is designed to ease conditions placed on debt relief 
by shifting from “content conditionality”  (debt relief contingent on nations undertaking 
specific policies) to “process conditionality” (debt relief contingent on nations doing 
certain things).  However, while debt relief is conditional only on countries having 
formulated a PRSP, and not on specific policies contained therein, it appears that donor 
nations still attempt to influence nations to include certain policies (Driscoll and Evans, 
2005).  Furthermore, the argument can be made that PRSPs are made less “national” 
because they are written only because donors want them to be written (Dijkstra, 2005).  
While this may be true in some cases, the example of Uganda, which formulated its own 
PEAP (Poverty Eradication Action Plan) in 1997 prior to the institution of the Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative, contradicts this theory and shows that the desire for strategies to reduce 
poverty does exist within individual nations.  Nevertheless, the World Bank and IMF do 
monitor and assess the content each country’s PRSP, and consequently some of the 
policies contained within a nation’s PRSP will most likely be less “domestic” and more 
tailored to appease these institutions (Dijkstra, 2005). 
Driscoll and Evans (2005) present some further shortcomings of the PRSP 
approach.  First of all, while the PRSP approach to has led to strong government 
involvement in poverty reduction, this needs to evolve into an institutionalized and 
lasting effort to reduce poverty.  This can be done better by evaluating the costs of 
policies outlined in the PRSP and factoring these costs into a budget in a more efficient 
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way.  Secondly, although PRSPs are formulated with the help of civil society, this 
collaboration needs to be expanded to include more sectors of civil society.  This 
expansion of civil society involvement must include more input from the poor and 
organizations that work with the poor, as these groups are supposed to be the 
beneficiaries of the PRSP approach, but have in general been underrepresented in the 
formulation of PRSPs.  Getting more civil society involved in the entire process will 
potentially lead to greater government accountability and transparency when it comes to 
poverty reduction.  
Also, it appears that there are a number of potential macroeconomic problems 
with the PRSPs.  Not only are the financial resources sometimes inadequate to achieve 
the goals outlined in a PRSP, but also it is often not clearly defined how countries 
propose to achieve pro-poor growth (Gottschalk, 2005).  In other words, there are bound 
to be questions as to whether to allocate resources to finance capital expenditure and thus 
growth, or to allocate resources towards social spending and thus poverty reduction.  In 
essence, the PRSPs do not always take into account the opportunity costs of foregoing 
capital expenditures that would lead to economic growth.  Finally, many countries’ 
PRSPs call for balanced budgets and other policies that leave them relatively fiscally 
inflexible.  Consequently, these countries will be handicapped in dealing with economic 
volatility and exogenous shocks.  This is a rather important point as many of the countries 
are quite susceptible to exogenous shocks, and because poverty has been shown to 
increase in nations following exogenous shocks (Gottshcalk, 2005).    
Finally, there are a number of questions related to the eligibility criteria for the 
HIPC Initiative. These questions include: what happens to countries that are indebted but 
do not have a level of debt deemed to be unsustainable? Does the HIPC system create 
incentives for countries to be irresponsible in controlling their debt, and reward such 
countries for their irresponsibility? And should the HIPC Initiative provide some relief to 
countries who have a sustainable level of debt, but are still struggling nonetheless?  First 
of all, in terms of eligibility, one of the motives behind the Enhanced HIPC Initiative was 
to allow for the inclusion of more countries.  Michaelowa (2003) notes that the original 
HIPC Initiative was not attractive for many developing countries, and the Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative was more appealing because their was a perception on the part of debtor 
countries that less political reform was necessary to receive debt relief.  Despite this 
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perceived increase in flexibility of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, there is still criticism 
that debt relief schemes provide incentives for poor debt management and policy and 
reward such behavior with further debt relief.   
Easterly (2002) discusses a few of the paradoxical incentives created by the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  Easterly makes a few interesting points.  First of all, he 
suggests that the factors that cause high debt are not easily changed simply by providing 
debt relief.  Furthermore, he implies that past experiences with debt relief have brought 
no promised benefits and have not reduced debt.  Citing the fact that debt relief schemes 
have become progressively more favorable for debtor nations, Easterly suggests that 
countries have an incentive to run up high levels of debt in anticipation of debt relief, and 
that they will delay necessary policy reforms while waiting for the best debt relief “deal.”  
Furthermore, Easterly suggests that governments have the incentive to zig zag back and 
forth with their policy decisions.  In other words, governments have the incentive to 
pursue bad policies, run up high levels of debt, improve policies to receive debt relief, 
and then revert back to poor policies and run up high levels of debt once again.  Thus, 
debt relief is useless for countries that do not change their long run development 
orientation and policies.  In brief Easterly is critical of the incentives created by the HIPC 
Initiative because he notes that HIPC countries became heavily indebted after 20 years of 
debt relief.  The one flaw with Easterly’s argument lies in the fact that the HIPC Initiative 
represents the first time multi-lateral debt has become eligible for forgiveness.  For 
example, Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004) note that although Uganda has received debt 
relief since the late 1980s, these previous efforts had little impact as Uganda owed over 
70 percent its overall debt to multilateral donors. 
There are not only questions surrounding the incentives created by the Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative, but also concerning whether its scope is too narrow.  Chowdhury (2004) 
uses econometric models that compare the impact of indebtedness on the countries 
eligible for the Enhanced HIPC Initiative to the impact of indebtedness on other severely 
indebted countries that have not qualified for the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  Chowdhury 
shows that the long-term economic growth of indebted countries that are not part of the 
HIPC also suffers due to their indebtedness.  Thus he argues that the HIPC Initiative 
should include all of these countries as well.  Similarly Teunissen (2004) criticizes the 
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Enhanced HIPC Initiative on the grounds that it does not include countries that are 
equally poor and have similar debt problems as the countries that are included.  
As they currently stand, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the forthcoming MDRI 
(Multilateral debt relief Initiative) represent significant changes in the development 
policy arena.  For the first time, multilateral debt has become eligible for forgiveness, and 
what is more, the policy seems to be heading not just for the goal of sustainable debt, but 
also for 100 % forgiveness of debt.  Also, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative is quite 
important as it sets a goal of providing a link between debt relief and poverty reduction.  
Countries wishing to become eligible for debt relief must formulate a PRSP (Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper) that outlines a detailed plan as to how a country plans to link 
their debt relief to poverty reduction and pro-poor economic growth.  The PRSPs contain 
policies to promote growth by improving factors such as poor educational systems that 
are seen as having a detrimental effect on a country’s economic growth and performance.  
The next section examines another factor addressed by the PRSPs that is perceived to be 
harming the economic growth of a country.  The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a major crisis for 
many African nations not just on a humanitarian level, but on an economic level as well.  
Consequently, HIPC countries address the HIV/AIDS problem in their PRSPs.  The next 
section will explore the economic ramifications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
III. The Economics of HIV/AIDS 
The figures concerning the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa are simply 
staggering.  Table 4 presents some figures for Sub-Saharan Africa, while Table 5 presents 
some of the same figures for the three countries to be considered in case studies.  
According to World Health Organization estimates, the Sub-Saharan African region is 
home to more than 60% of the world’s population living with HIV/AIDS, despite the fact 
that it accounts for slightly over 10% of the world’s entire population.  As Table 5 
indicates, in Uganda alone there are close to 1 million children who have lost at least one 
parent to HIV/AIDS.  Clearly, the AIDS epidemic in Africa is a humanitarian crisis. The 
question is however, what are the economic implications of such a health crisis?  More 
specifically, does HIV/AIDS have an effect on economic growth, and if so, how?     
Table 4: Estimated Sub-Saharan Africa HIV/AIDS statistics 
 Adults and 
Children 
Living with 
Number of 
women 
living with 
Adults and 
Children 
Newly 
Adult 
Prevalence 
(%) 
Adults and 
Child Deaths 
due to AIDS 
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HIV HIV Infected with 
HIV 
2005 25.8 million 13.2 million 3.2 million 7.2 2.4 million 
2003 24.9 million 13.1 million 3.0 million 7.3 2.1 million 
Source: World Health Organization (2005) 
Table 5: Estimated HIV/AIDS Statistics, end of 2003 
Country Adults 
and 
children 
living 
with 
HIV 
(2003) 
Adults (15-
49),  
Children 
(0-15) 
Women 
(15-49) 
Number 
of 
deaths 
due to 
AIDS 
in 2003 
Adult 
prevalence 
rate 
Number 
of 
Orphan
s due to 
AIDS 
Burkina 
Faso 
300,000 270,000 31,000 150,000 29,000 4.2 260,000 
Ghana 350,000 320,000 24,000 180,000 30,000 3.1 170,000 
Uganda 530,000 450,000 84,000 270,000 78,000 4.1 940,000 
Source: UNAIDS (2004) 
 In an early study of the issue of the impact of AIDS on growth, Cuddington and 
Hancock (1994) use a Solow growth model and the case of Malawi to conclude that 
AIDS does indeed hinder economic growth.  They estimate that a prevalence rate rising 
to 11% by 2010 will lead to a decline in per capita income and a decline in the GDP 
growth rate.  This study however, underestimates the true scale of the epidemic in 
Malawi, as the prevalence rate had risen to 14.2% by the end of 2003. On the other hand, 
Bloom and Mahal (1997) use cross country regressions and control for other factors that 
might influence growth to conclude, “there is more flash than substance to the claim that 
AIDS impedes national economic growth.”  These earlier studies are problematic, 
however, for a few reasons.  First of all, as is evidenced by the predictions made by 
Cuddington and Hancock (1994) and the actual situation in Malawi, these studies tend to 
underestimate the scale of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Also, as Gaffeo (2003) remarks, 
HIV/AIDS is peculiar in that unlike other diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS affects 
mainly sexually active individuals whose ages for the most part match up with the active 
work force.  The implication is that HIV/AIDS is bound to hurt worker productivity in a 
way that other diseases will not.  Furthermore, HIV/AIDS seems to affect the unskilled 
sector of the workforce more so than the skilled sector, a fact that needs to be taken into 
account to understand how HIV/AIDS affects productivity and economic growth.  
Finally, unlike the Black Death of the Middle Ages or the 1918-1919 influenza epidemic, 
AIDS has a long incubation period meaning that the true impact of the epidemic in terms 
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of human capital loss, health care costs, and social costs are not likely to be observed 
until a number of years after the virus achieves a high rate of prevalence amongst the 
population (Gaffeo, 2003).   
 Given these limitations of the earlier models, perhaps the study done by Bonnel 
(2000) is a more accurate assessment of how HIV/AIDS affects economic growth.  
Bonnel uses data from 1990-1997 in a cross country regression model to reach the 
conclusion that in the absence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic the per capita income in Africa 
would have grown by nearly three times the amount it actually did during the period from 
1990-1997.  Furthermore, GDP growth is estimated to be 2.6 % lower each year due to 
HIV/AIDS, meaning that at the end of a 20 year period GDP would be 67 % less than it 
would have been had the HIV/AIDS epidemic not been a factor.  This study seems to 
refute the more optimistic conclusions reached by the earlier studies concerning the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on growth.     
It is interesting to note that all of the studies view the high rates of mortality 
associated with the epidemic as something that could potentially increase per capita 
income.  In essence, if the increased mortality due to the epidemic leads to lower 
population and consequently lower labor force growth, then per capita income should 
increase.  It may seem counterintuitive that an epidemic that kills millions could actually 
increase per capita income, but it makes perfect economic sense.  A decline in the supply 
of labor would lead to higher wages as the limited labor now available becomes more 
highly sought after.  Furthermore, a decline in the labor force while holding other factors 
such as land and capital constant is likely to increase per capita income.  Indeed, this is 
exactly what occurred in the wake of the Black Death in Europe.  As Stark (2005) notes, 
although the bubonic plague killed a third of Europe’s population between the years 
1347-1350, it led to a dramatic increase in the standard of living for those who survived.  
An initial labor shortage due to the plague led to increased wages for workers and greater 
opportunities for laborers, particularly for serfs.  Furthermore, due to surpluses, food 
prices declined and this in turn led to increased urbanization and output of goods.  Thus, 
as Stark points out, the net result of the plague was “A substantial increase in the 
purchasing power of the average European.”  
Nevertheless, the economic impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is likely to be 
different from the effect of the Black Death on medieval Europe due to the differing 
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natures of the epidemics themselves.  Not only are the methods of transmission different, 
but the epidemics claim their victims at different rates.  HIV/AIDS is a slow killer while 
those infected with the Black Death succumb only a few days after being infected.  Most 
studies conclude that in the case of HIV/AIDS there is no evidence of this potential per 
capita income growth and furthermore, the effects on per capita income do not mean that 
GDP growth will be unaffected. 
 Despite the discrepancies between the result of the earlier and later studies on the 
effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on growth, there is consensus that if HIV/AIDS affects 
economic growth it is likely to do so in specific ways.  Economic growth models in their 
simplest form usually view growth as some output function of effective labor and capital.  
More complex models may include policy variables and even geographic variables to 
account for various geographic features of a country.  Therefore, any fashion in which 
HIV/AIDS potentially damages effective labor or capital accumulation; it potentially 
damages economic growth as well.  In short, HIV/AIDS is viewed as potentially 
damaging to growth due to its effects on human capital, social capital, and savings and 
investment. 
 The HIV/AIDS epidemic has the potential to affect human capital through a 
variety of channels.  First, as HIV/AIDS disproportionately affects the segment of the 
population that comprises the active labor force, there will be some destruction of human 
capital due to the deaths of workers (Gaffeo, 2003).  As information was scarce in the 
early days of the epidemic, HIV/AIDS affected both the skilled and unskilled segments of 
the population, resulting in the loss of many skilled workers, teachers, professionals and 
civil servants.  As information on the virus as well as prevention methods have become 
more available, skilled workers now have a greater incentive to invest in information and 
prevention methods as the cost of becoming infected with the virus increases as education 
and training increases (Bonnel, 2000). Also, beyond the outright loss of human capital 
due to the deaths of workers, those suffering from HIV/AIDS are likely to have lower 
productivity or miss days of work due to poor health, thereby lowering overall labor 
productivity.  Thus, in this fashion, the epidemic has a direct and immediate affect on 
human capital. 
 The epidemic however, indirectly damages human capital as well.  Due to the 
epidemic workers have less of an incentive to invest in training and education because 
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they are less likely to live to see the fruits of such an investment (Bonnel, 2000).  For 
those living with HIV/AIDS there is clearly a decreased incentive to invest in education.  
However, Bonnel does not acknowledge the fact that those not affected by HIV/AIDS 
will likely have incentives to invest in greater education and training.  If the epidemic 
results in a labor shortage due to high rates of mortality and wages increase, than those 
not infected can maximize their potential wages by investing in education and training.  
Thus, while on the whole the epidemic may lead to decreased incentives for educational 
investment, the incentives will be increased for certain groups. 
HIV/AIDS also affects educational attainment through another channel.  If the 
HIV/AIDS virus affects parents, the responsibilities of running a household may fall on 
their children.  As a result, these children are often forced to withdraw from school, and 
they obtain a lower level of education than they would have otherwise.  The implication 
is that with a lower level of education, children are likely to earn a lower wage.   
 Hamoudi and Birdsall (2004) suggest that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is likely to 
hurt human capital accumulation in four ways.  First of all, the epidemic will result in the 
deaths of many teachers.  This will lead to a difficulty of finding and keeping enough 
qualified teachers, and will increase the financial strain on governments as they must pay 
to train replacement teachers.  Secondly, a decrease in life expectancy due to HIV/AIDS 
makes education less attractive.  In other words, a shorter life span means the returns to 
education are lower, resulting in decreased incentives to invest in education.  Hamoudi 
and Birdsall estimate that a 10-year decrease in life expectancy will lead to a decrease of 
investment in education by .8 to 1.3 years.  Bonnel (2000) supports this result in finding 
the HIV prevalence rate to be a significant variable in explaining the decline in secondary 
school enrollment.  Thirdly, the death of skilled workers leads to a reduction in the 
agglomerative economies of scale associated with interaction between skilled workers.  
In other words, a group of skilled workers are more productive when working together 
than they would be were they to work alone.  The HIV/AIDS epidemic reduces the 
increasing returns to scale associated with this type of grouping of skilled workers.  
Finally, Birdsall and Hamoudi assume that physical and human capital are complements 
and therefore, a reduction in human capital will lead to a reduction in physical capital 
which will further impede growth.  In brief, the effect of HIV/AIDS on human capital 
and consequently on growth are quite significant, as an initial reduction of human capital 
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caused by AIDS is multiplied over time by reduced incentives to invest in human capital 
(Bonnel, 2000).   
 Recently, social capital has been found to be significant when it comes to 
economic growth.  Knack and Keefer (1997) use a cross-country regression analysis and 
find that social capital variables are significant in explaining economic performance and 
growth.  Thus, if HIV/AIDS affects social capital, it is likely to affect a country’s overall 
economic performance and growth. 
 The effects of HIV/AIDS on social capital appear to be important on two levels.  
First of all, there is often a stigma associated with HIV/AIDS.  This stigma not only 
weakens family ties, but it weakens social networks.  Together with AIDS related deaths, 
the epidemic weakens communities, civic organizations, communal safety nets and other 
social ties that help make up social capital (Gaffeo, 2003).  On a greater scale, HIV/AIDS 
impedes a government’s ability to provide social services, efficient economic policy 
organization, and a viable legal framework and regulation.  This effect depends largely 
on the extent to which HIV/AIDS affects civil servants, although there is at least 
anecdotal evidence that deaths of civil servants do indeed hinder governments’ ability to 
manage economic policy and social services (Sachs, 2005).    
Finally, the HIV/AIDS epidemic negatively impacts growth due to its effects on 
savings and investment.  A decrease in savings is associated with HIV/AIDS, as 
governments must dip into savings in order to finance the rising health care expenditures 
come along with HIV/AIDS.  This decrease in savings is made all the more tangible 
when one considers that the cost of treating one AIDS patient in Sub-Saharan Africa is on 
average more than 2.5 times the level of GDP per capita (Gaffeo, 2003). The fiscal deficit 
is also likely to worsen as governments incur additional expenses by having to pay for the 
pensions of civil servants who have died from AIDS.  In most of the countries hit the 
hardest by the epidemic, governments are simply unable to offset the increased 
expenditures associated with HIV/AIDS by increasing taxes or cutting expenditures in 
other areas, and consequently must dip into savings (Bonnel, 2000). Bonnel (2000) finds 
the HIV prevalence rate to be a significant variable in explaining the decline in 
government savings, and notes that as domestic saving is the main way in which 
developing countries finance capital expenditures, a decrease in savings leads to a 
decrease in investment, and consequently in growth.  The same study also suggests, 
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however, that if the increased expenditures associated with the HIV/AIDS epidemic were 
to be financed externally, then the effect of a decrease in savings and investment could be 
mitigated.  Implicit in this statement is the need for external financing sources in helping 
developing countries deal with the increased expenditures associated with the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  Certainly, resources made available through increasing levels of debt relief 
could be one such source of financing.  Thus, if implemented effectively debt relief could 
potentially help growth prospects by allowing countries to deal with the HIV/AIDS crisis 
without compromising their levels of savings and investment.  
HIV/AIDS can impact economic growth through its impacts on human capital, 
social capital and savings and investment.  The grim reality is however, that HIV/AIDS 
can create a downward spiral in a country’s economic performance and growth, due to 
feedback effects.  Due to reverse causality, wherein several factors that are important to 
economic growth such as a strong educational and health care system are also important 
in determining the extent to which HIV/AIDS spreads, the HIV/AIDS epidemic can 
create a harmful cycle.  HIV/AIDS can negatively impact growth, and this poor growth 
performance leaves a country unable to strengthen its health and educational systems 
leading to increasing levels of HIV/AIDS, which in turn harm economic growth once 
again (Bonnel, 2000).  This multiplied effect of HIV/AIDS on economic growth makes it 
even more important for governments to form effective, well directed and goal oriented 
policies for fighting the epidemic.   
The HIV/AIDS epidemic also plays a role in birth rates within a country.  The 
epidemic is likely to inflate birth rates as parents, who to some degree view children as a 
sort of life insurance policy as well as a source of labor and consequently income, have 
more children than normal in order to offset the potential of losing some children at a 
younger age due to AIDS.  Therefore, a note on the impact of birth rates on economic 
growth is in order.  The debate surrounding the impact of birth rates on economic growth 
remains unresolved.  Depending on the source, high rates of fertility are viewed as having 
a negative, positive and neutral effect on growth rates.  Looking not only at a 
population’s birth rate, but at the overall age structure of a population, Bloom, Canning 
and Sevilla (2001) suggest that high rates of fertility hurt sub-Saharan Africa’s growth 
prospects.  Consistently high birth rates in sub-Saharan Africa leave the region unable to 
capitalize on what Bloom, Canning and Sevilla refer to as the “demographic dividend.”  
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In other words, other regions have experienced a temporary population boom at one time 
or another and were able to allocate their resources accordingly in order to maximize 
their growth perspectives as the boom generation aged.  A consistently high level of 
fertility in sub-Saharan Africa due to a variety of health, social, cultural and political 
issues means that sub-Saharan Africa has not had a temporary population boom on which 
it could potentially capitalize.  Bloom, Canning and Sevilla conclude that “as long as 
fertility remains high and families have large numbers of children, sub-Saharan African 
countries are unlikely to see rising incomes or healthier and better educated workers.” 
 Assuming high birth rates to be harmful for growth prospects in the case of sub-
Saharan African countries, a few judgments can be made about the three countries to be 
examined in case studies, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Uganda.  Both Uganda and Burkina 
Faso have birth rates of 6 births per woman, while Ghana’s rate is 4 per woman.  Thus, 
the high levels of fertility in Uganda and Burkina Faso relative to Ghana imply that birth 
fertility rates will be more of a hindrance to economic growth in Uganda and Burkina 
Faso than in Ghana.  It must be restated, however, that the debate surrounding the 
relationship of birth rates and economic growth is not fully resolved, and thus it is 
difficult to say what the overall importance of differing levels of fertility actually is.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between fertility, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and economic 
growth is something that should be addressed by a country’s PRSP.  None of the three 
countries in the case study address this issue, however, and choose to focus more on the 
reduction of infant mortality.  This is perhaps indicative of a belief that a reduction in 
infant mortality will reduce birth rates.  
 Based on the high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
question as to how best to formulate policy to help fight HIV/AIDS seems to be a 
difficult one to answer.  Bonnel (2000) suggests that reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS 
and limiting its impacts on growth will require sound macroeconomic policy, structural 
policy reforms, and providing individuals with incentives that will make them more 
likely to engage in behaviors and practices that will help prevent the spread of AIDS.   In 
terms of macroeconomic policies, the implication is that good macroeconomic policy will 
lead to growth, which will provide governments with the resources they need to fight 
HIV/AIDS.  The structural reforms recommended are ones that address various forms of 
inequality, such as ethnic, income and gender inequality, all of which have been found to 
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be highly correlated with high levels of HIV/AIDS prevalence.  In terms of providing 
individuals with incentives, it is suggested that improving access to health care and 
treatment will provide individuals with more incentive to engage in preventative 
measures.  Interestingly, these recommendations all seem to be addressed by the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  The Enhanced HIPC Initiative requires countries to undertake 
macroeconomic policy reforms, and to formulate a PRSP that addresses both issues of 
inequality and health care.  The implication is that countries qualifying for the HIPC 
Initiative may be by default more likely to adopt policies that will lead to lower levels of 
HIV/AIDS and better growth. 
These objectives are more easily stated than met however, as they require 
significant resources, especially in the case of the last objective.  Given the limited 
resources available to HIPC countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the policy decisions as to 
how to cope with the AIDS epidemic create a number of allocation problems.  Gaffeo 
(2003) divides the allocation problem that governments face into three stages: 1) deciding 
how much government spending should be devoted to health care as opposed to other 
expenditures, 2) deciding what portion of the health care budget should be devoted to 
fighting HIV/AIDS, and 3) deciding how much to spend on preventative or curative 
efforts for HIV/AIDS.  Clearly, the key word in this type of analysis is opportunity cost, 
as there is an opportunity cost associated with each decision.  The first stage of the 
problem deals with the fiscal constraints a government faces.  Logically speaking, an 
HIPC country receiving debt relief should have more money to spend on health care 
expenditures than they would if they were not receiving debt relief.  In other words, if a 
country is receiving debt relief, it does not have to make the choice between spending 
money on health care and spending money to pay off its debt.  Whether or not a country 
chooses to use their debt relief to finance increased health care expenditures is a separate 
question and will be examined more thoroughly in the case studies, however the 
important fact is that the possibility exists.  The second part of the allocation problem is 
really an assessment of the opportunity cost of fighting HIV/AIDS relative to other 
diseases such as malaria, which is also a huge problem in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In 
essence, if more deaths can be averted per dollar spent by treating malaria as opposed to 
treating HIV/AIDS it is more efficient to devote more resources towards fighting malaria.  
Finally, the third part of the allocation is a question of whether it is more efficient to treat 
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those with HIV/AIDS or to try and prevent future infections.  This poses a number of 
other questions depending on the goal of a government’s HIV/AIDS policy.  If the 
government’s goal in treating HIV/AIDS is to simply create robust economic growth, it 
may make sense for a government to focus most of its resources on preventing new 
infections.  More specifically, prevent new infections in the skilled workers of their 
population and not devoting resources to those infected with HIV/AIDS as they are likely 
to die anyway.  On the other hand, if the goals of a government are to provide a 
comprehensive approach to fighting HIV/AIDS, then resources are likely to be more 
equally divided between curative and preventative measures.  This decision is in fact, 
quite complex.  Even in terms of preventing the spread of AIDS there arise a number of 
similar allocation problems.  For example, in terms of preventing the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, it may be more effective to cut transmission rates of the disease by treating 
other STDs (Sexually Transmitted Diseases), as presence of other STDs has been shown 
to increase the transmission rate of HIV/AIDS, than to try and change sexual behavior in 
the hopes of slowing the epidemic (Oster, 2005).  This means that perhaps the best way to 
prevent future infections is to treat other STDs.  Clearly, when faced with an epidemic of 
HIV/AIDS, the policy decisions are not easy ones.    
 There are a number of more specific policy issues related to HIV/AIDS and the 
HIPC Initiative and the PRSP process.  Given that a country’s PRSP generally has the 
stated goal of poverty reduction and pro-poor economic growth, the HIV/AIDS strategy 
contained there within should be in harmony and tailored to how a country plans to 
execute economic growth.  For example, if a country views one sector as relatively more 
important than another in terms of economic growth, then it would make sense that a 
country’s PRSP stipulate that more resources made available through debt relief go 
towards fighting HIV/AIDS amongst the workers in the more important sector.  In order 
to create this type of harmonization and ensure that the role of HIV/AIDS as a hindrance 
to development is recognized and accounted for, a PRSP should include several elements.  
A PRSP should: 1) earmark resources made available from the HIPC Initiative that will 
go specifically towards fighting HIV/AIDS, 2) highlight AIDS as a cause of poverty, and 
illustrate its negative economic impacts, 3) lay out the main strategies of what is ideally a 
multi-sector and cross cutting national plan to fight HIV/AIDS 4) set medium term goals 
and specify indicators to monitor these goals 5) specify how a country will respond to the 
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negative effect that HIV/AIDS has on human capital and economic growth (UNAIDS, 
2001).  This last point has been particularly difficult for countries to address in their 
PRSPs, although it is quite important to ensuring that the fight against HIV/AIDS helps 
contribute to the type of pro-poor growth that is the aim of the PRSP process.   
In conclusion, the pandemic has raised a vast number of policy questions that 
involve a great deal of complexity.  What is best for a country in terms of HIV/AIDS 
policy is not always clear.  As an illustration of that complexity, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
has reached such a scale in poor countries that are often so constrained in how they can 
fight the disease that the creation of a vaccine may be the most promising hope for them 
to control the epidemic (Rauner and Brandeau, 2001).  However, while a vaccine may be 
the best hope for an HIPC country, it is not likely to invest its resources in researching a 
vaccine.  Thus, the incentive exists for an HIPC to potentially use resources made 
available from debt relief to invest in vaccine research, but they are not likely to do so as 
the resources available are likely not sufficient to allow for substantial advancements.  
Furthermore, in terms of keeping the HIV/AIDS epidemic in check, the countries that 
have been most successful are countries such as Cuba and Thailand.  These countries 
have to some extent ignored human rights by forcing those affected with the virus to live 
in segregated communities. While human rights have been violated, these strategies have 
worked.  Other measures that may constitute human rights violations such as enforced 
HIV testing, enforced condom usage, and forced compliance with drug treatment 
regimens are likely to help stop the spread of HIV/AIDS (Allen, 2004).  Thus, the spread 
of HIV/AIDS may hinge on how willing a government is to adopt policies that infringe 
on human rights.   
As this last point particularly highlights, the policy decisions surrounding 
HIV/AIDS are never easy or pretty.  They are truly life and death decisions that have the 
potential to have a tremendously positive or a tremendously negative influence on a vast 
number of people.  The complexities of HIV/AIDS policy decisions are compounded 
when they are placed in the context of the HIPC Initiative.  A country should strive to 
harmonize its HIV/AIDS strategy as presented in its PRSP with its strategy for growth as 
presented in the same PRSP. 
PRSPs play a crucial role in the Enhanced HIPC Initiative as well as in defining 
how a country designs its policy to combat HIV/AIDS.  In the next section, the strategies 
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formulated by three HIPC countries (Burkina Faso, Ghana and Uganda) all facing an 
HIV/AIDS epidemic of a similar scale will be examined.  Keeping in mind the economic 
ramifications of an HIV/AIDS epidemic as well as the policy questions discussed in this 
section, a careful economic analysis of each country’s strategy will be undertaken.  In 
essence, we will try and determine how each country has chosen to answer the complex 
policy challenges created by an HIV/AIDS epidemic in light of the fact that their 
resources have been expanded due to debt relief.  Furthermore, an analysis will be 
undertaken of how this strategy responds to the negative effects on human capital and 
economic growth caused by HIV/AIDS, as well as how a country’s strategy to fight 
HIV/AIDS harmonizes with their strategy for growth.  Based on this analysis, some 
conclusions can be reached about how each country’s prospects for economic growth 
have been affected by their HIV/AIDS strategies.  Consequently some predictions can be 
made about how an HIPC can best use additional resources from debt relief to achieve 
the goal of fighting HIV/AIDS and achieving higher levels of economic growth. 
IV. Case studies 
Given that the interaction between debt relief, AIDS and economic growth will 
not play itself out the same in every country, case studies of three countries, Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, and Uganda, will be undertaken.  These three countries have been selected 
based on a number of criteria, but generally speaking they appear to be the most similar 
out of the African countries that have reached the completion point of the HIPC 
Initiative.  First of all, and most importantly, all three countries had to have reached the 
completion point of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  This means that they have been 
involved in the Enhanced HIPC Initiative to its fullest extent, and that they have not only 
received substantial amounts of debt relief, but are also eligible for 100 percent 
multilateral debt forgiveness under the MDRI.  Secondly, Burkina Faso, Ghana and 
Uganda share similar levels of AIDS prevalence and relevant economic indicators.  Table 
6 presents some of these indicators, to demonstrate the similarities between the countries.  
Obviously, there are differences between the three, as the difference in population 
indicates.  Furthermore, the chart does not show other differences economic, political, 
geographic and otherwise.         
Table 6: Selected Comparative Statistics  
Country Adult AIDS 
prevalence 
Population, 
In thousands 
2003, GNI 
per capita  
GDP growth 
2003, %  
Per capita 
expenditure 
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rate, end 
2003 
in US $ on 
healthcare 
2002, US $ 
Burkina 
Faso 
4.2 13393 320 7 11 
Ghana 3.1 21377 200 5 17 
Uganda 4.1 26699 250 5 18 
      
 Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Uganda, however, share the necessary characteristics that 
make them good candidates for comparative case studies.  Namely, they all have reached 
the highest level of the HIPC Initiative, and consequently all are receiving debt relief, and 
they all have a similar level of AIDS prevalence.  Thus, the AIDS epidemic is of roughly 
the same magnitude in each country, and in essence each country will choose a different 
strategy to address a problem that should be expected to have, all other things equal, a 
similar economic impact on each individual country. 
 
IV.1  Burkina Faso 
 The PRSP prepared by Burkina Faso does indeed recognize the importance of 
HIV/AIDS.  Moreover, the PRSP recognizes the potential negative economic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS.  The PRSP acknowledges that HIV/AIDS adversely affects farms by 
weakening and depleting the workforce, as well as by depleting resources.  It also notes 
that HIV/AIDS has had a visible impact affecting the workforce, the well-being of 
households and the production structure of the economy.  Furthermore, the PRSP 
acknowledges that there is potential for a 33 to 43% increase in government health care 
expenditures due to HIV/AIDS.  These observed effects seem to be consistent with the 
negative effects associated with HIV/AIDS described in the relevant literature, by Bonnel 
(2000) as well as others.  The PRSP recognizes the negative impact of the epidemic on 
the productivity of the economy, and acknowledges that work needs to be done to deal 
with the problem.   Despite what appears to be a declining or at least a leveling off of 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Burkina Faso, the strategy to combat HIV/AIDS as presented 
in the PRSP does not seem to fully harmonize with Burkina Faso’s strategy for economic 
growth.  In other words, while Burkina Faso recognizes the role that HIV/AIDS 
potentially plays in economic growth, it does not tailor its HIV/AIDS strategy to help 
foster that growth in the best possible fashion.  Cuddington and Hancock (1994) present a 
Y = ALe
βK1−β
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model that uses the following aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate 
the impact of HIV/AIDS on economic growth:  
  L and K are effective labor and capital and β is the labor share of national 
output.  Cuddington and Hancock suggest that the HIV/AIDS epidemic will affect growth 
due to its impact on the quality of the work force, which depends on the workers health 
and experience.  Furthermore, the medical expenditures related to HIV/AIDS are 
expected to deplete savings, and thus lower investment.  The evidence suggests that this 
latter point is not true for Burkina Faso, at least under the period covered by the HIPC 
Initiative as capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 9.2 percent in 
1996 to a projected 10.9 percent in 2006.  On the other hand, while Burkina Faso 
recognizes the detrimental effect of the HIV/AIDS crisis on its labor force, it does not do 
enough to address the problem in key sectors 
IV.1.2  Burkina Faso’s strategy to fight HIV/AIDS 
 According to the PRSP published in 2004, Burkina Faso plans to make 
HIV/AIDS one of the priority areas of its strategy to reduce poverty and create growth.  
The PRSP is organized into the four pillars of:  
-Accelerating broad-based growth 
-Guaranteeing that the poor have access to basic social services 
-Expanding opportunities for employment and income-generating activities for 
the poor 
-Promoting good governance. 
Burkina Faso outlines its strategy for combating HIV/AIDS under the 
“guaranteeing that the poor have access to basic social services” pillar of its PRSP.   
According to the PRSP, Burkina Faso resolves to fight HIV/AIDS by strengthening the 
multi-sector, decentralized and participatory approach to fighting HIV/AIDS, promoting 
voluntary and anonymous testing, strengthening the medical care of people living with 
HIV/AIDS, improving the overall social and economic care of people affected by 
HIV/AIDS, and incorporating the fight against HIV/AIDS into all development projects.  
This approach to fighting HIV/AIDS places great importance on improving the 
affordability and availability of treatment, as well as on increasing patient care capacity.  
The strategy cites improving behavioral change strategy as the key area of improvement 
for prevention strategies.  It highlights the importance of involving local, tribal and 
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religious leaders in reducing the social stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and creating 
important behavioral changes.  Such involvement has proven to be effective in creating 
behavioral change that lowers the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Allen and Heald, 2004).  
The strategy however, while not completely ignoring the importance of prevention, 
places little importance on expanding the role of education and information programs, 
which is in direct contrast to earlier versions of Burkina Faso’s PRSP which placed a 
much greater emphasis on the role of education and the dissemination of information 
relating to HIV/AIDS.   
This shift in strategy could be a result of what Burkina Faso perceives to be a 
decline in prevalence rate from 4.1% in 2002 to 1.9% in 2003.  This figure is most likely 
optimistic, since the UNAIDS estimate, obtained using different testing methods, for the 
end of 2003 was 4.2%.  UNAIDS however, suggests that its estimates indicate that the 
epidemic is at least leveling off in Burkina Faso.  While not dropping its multi-sector 
approach that includes education and information programs, it appears Burkina Faso has 
decided to focus its expansion in the fight against HIV/AIDS on the treatment of and care 
for those suffering from the disease.   This is most likely because a declining prevalence 
rate is perceived as an indicator that the prevention strategies in place are adequate, and 
resources could best be used to expand treatment capacities.  In brief, the PRSP of 
Burkina Faso indicates that Burkina Faso has chosen most recently to dedicate most of its 
resources towards expanding testing for HIV/AIDS and increasing its capacity to care for 
those suffering from HIV/AIDS, perhaps in response to what it perceives as a declining 
prevalence rate.   
IV.1.3Burkina Faso’s economic situation and growth strategy 
The economic situation in Burkina Faso poses daunting challenges for 
development and economic growth, yet there exists potential.  By developing currently 
undeveloped or underdeveloped sectors, Burkina Faso can potentially improve its overall 
economic performance.  Although a landlocked country, Burkina Faso would like to 
carve a place for itself as an economic crossroads between coastal West African countries 
and other landlocked nations. 
Burkina Faso is a member of the WAEMU (West African Economic and 
Monetary Union).  As such it shares a common currency, the CFA Franc, with eight other 
West African nations.  As a result, Burkina Faso does not determine its own monetary 
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policy, as that is determined by the BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States).  In 
fact, the BCEAO does not truly determine its own monetary policy as the CFA Franc is 
pegged to the euro.  This leaves Burkina Faso very vulnerable to the euro/dollar exchange 
rate.  Furthermore, as part of the WAEMU, Burkina Faso has agreed to the WAEMU 
Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact.  The criteria of this pact are: a 
nominal fiscal balance, a maximum wage bill to tax revenue ratio of 35%, a maximum 
debt to GDP ratio of 70%, and a maximum inflation rate of 3%.  These criteria are quite 
strict, and as a result Burkina Faso is relatively fiscally inflexible (Gottschalk, 2005).        
The economy of Burkina Faso is not incredibly diverse, and it offers few 
comparative advantages and natural resources.  Agriculture currently dominates the 
economy of Burkina Faso, as it accounts for 35% of GDP and 60 % of export earnings.  It 
employs and provides income for 80 % of the population, as most Burkinabé practice 
subsistence agriculture.  In 2003, agriculture expanded by 10.7 %, and served as the main 
source of economic growth in Burkina Faso (OECD, 2005).  Table 7 displays the sectoral 
growth rates for Burkina Faso’s economy.  The primary sector includes agriculture, 
livestock, fisheries, hunting and forestry; the secondary sector includes mining 
manufacturing, energy, construction and public works; the tertiary sector includes 
transport and telecommunications, trade, banks, insurance and other services.  With a 
high level of dependence on agriculture, Burkina Faso is susceptible to exogenous shocks 
in the form of volatile weather, such as droughts or floods, and insects.  The fluctuating 
primary sector growth rate figures presented in Table 7 are a reflection of this 
susceptibility. 
Table 7: Trends in Sector Growth, % 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 est. 2005 proj. 2006 proj. 
Primary 
Sector 
15.6 2.4 10.8 5.2 4.2 4.5 
Secondary 
Sector 
.4 14.1 10.4 4.1 7.0 10.1 
Tertiary 
Sector 
2.4 3.7 5.5 3.8 7.7 7.5 
Source: PRSP of Burkina Faso 
Moreover, Burkina Faso has a weak export base with cotton as the most important 
product.  Cotton accounts for between 60 and 70% of exports.  In a liberalizing move, the 
state owned cotton monopoly has recently turned over some its operation to two foreign 
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firms.  Nevertheless, this type of privatization scheme can do nothing to protect the 
fragile economy from the volatility of world cotton prices.   
It is in recognition of its lack of diversity that Burkina Faso outlines its strategy 
for growth in its PRSP.  The medium term annual growth rate target for per capita GDP 
growth is set at 4%.  Burkina Faso believes that growth will rely on export crops such 
cotton, fruits and vegetables, as well as on dynamic manufacturing exports from food 
processing, leather and cotton spinning industries.  Mining is also viewed as particularly 
important for short-term growth.  In order to achieve such growth there needs to be 
significant expansion in the food processing, leather and cotton spinning industries as 
well as in the mining industry.  These industries are all likely to be more capital intensive 
than the agricultural sector and thus will require increased capital expenditures.  
Interestingly, Gottschalk (2005) estimates that Burkina Faso’s investment is insufficient 
to meet its target growth rates.  While Burkina Faso would like to improve the role the 
services play in its economic growth, and sees potential to do so through the tourism 
industry, it acknowledges, “the government’s long-term development strategy will be 
based on expanding exports of goods.”   
In order to bolster economic diversity, Burkina Faso plans on expanding its 
privatization program.  By privatizing the mining, manufacturing, and energy sectors, 
Burkina Faso hopes to include these industries in a framework wherein the private sector 
will become an important engine for growth.   
In brief, Burkina Faso plans to achieve sustained economic growth by 
strengthening the industries that are already profitable, namely cotton, as well as by 
diversifying and expanding other industries, such as the livestock and mining industries. 
Burkina Faso hopes to create a private sector that will become an engine for growth by 
opening up its industries.  Nevertheless, the strategy does seem to rely too heavily on 
agricultural production, which is highly susceptible to shocks (World Bank, 2003). 
IV.1.4 HIV/AIDS strategy in the context of Burkina Faso’s growth strategy 
Briefly stated, Burkina Faso’s PRSP recognizes the potential impact of 
HIV/AIDS on economic growth, but it does not tailor HIV/AIDS policy to be consistent 
with their strategy to achieve economic growth.  The PRSP of Burkina Faso recognizes 
that weak human capital is one of the main obstacles for growth.  Weak human capital 
contributes to low labor productivity and high unemployment level in Burkina Faso.  
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Furthermore, the PRSP recognizes that HIV/AIDS is not only a health problem but also 
an impediment to development and human capital formation.  The PRSP also states, “for 
countries that are eligible for debt relief through the enhanced HIPC Initiative, there is a 
potential for significant increase in the public financing of HIV/AIDS control programs 
through the earmarking of funds” (Burkina Faso, 2004).  As Table 8 indicates, Burkina 
Faso has seized this opportunity by specifically indicating what portion of their debt 
relief resources will go towards fighting HIV/AIDS. 
 
 
 
Table 8-Sectoral breakdown of HIPC Resources (in billions of CFA Francs) 
Priority Sectors 2004 2005 2006 
Basic Education and Literacy 5.68 8.53 6.88 
Health 5.34 8.02 6.47 
HIV/AIDS .34 .51 .41 
Rural Development 
(Agriculture, water supply systems, fishery resources, 
animal resources, Infrastructure, transport, and town 
planning, Postal service and telecommunications/rural 
telephone service 
5.79 8.7 7.02 
Physical environment and living conditions  
(Sanitation-Fight against desertification, Mines, quarries, 
energy, small mining and rural electrification 
.79 1.19 ,96 
Public Security .34 .51 .41 
Trade, Business, and handicrafts development .23 .34 .28 
Capacity Building .34 .51 .41 
Other 
(Labor, employment and youth, social development and 
national solidarity, information, advancement of women, 
justice, economy and development-monitoring of poverty 
and regional poverty reduction strategy frameworks 
3.86 5.79 4.69 
Total 22.71 34.1 27.5 
Source: PRSP of Burkina Faso, 2004 
 Burkina Faso is helping its growth prospects by earmarking HIPC funds to 
specifically target HIV/AIDS, something viewed as quite important for helping growth in 
the context of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative (UNAIDS and the World Bank, 2001).  
While this is important, two things must be taken into account.  First, the in each of the 
three years presented in Table 8, HIV/AIDS receives only 1.5% of the HIPC resources.  
This places HIV/AIDS on equal footing as public security.  Secondly, the PRSP presents 
evidence that Burkina Faso may not be using the small percentage of dedicated towards 
HIV/AIDS in the most efficient manner possible.   
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Burkina Faso’s strategy for fighting HIV/AIDS as presented in the PRSP of 2004 
is one that focuses primarily on treatment of HIV/AIDS.  In this respect, Burkina Faso 
can be seen as attempting to improve the productivity of workers affected by HIV/AIDS.  
In essence, Burkina Faso is focusing more on improving human capital by increasing 
productivity of those afflicted with HIV/AIDS than by protecting its workforce by 
preventing new infections.  Moreover, Burkina Faso’s strategy for economic growth 
relies on the growth of a few specific industries.   The expansion of the mining, livestock 
and fruit and vegetable export industries are all viewed as particularly important.  With 
this in mind, it would perhaps be most efficient for the HIV/AIDS treatment and 
prevention programs to target workers in these industries.  In other words, in terms of 
economic growth, it might be most efficient for Burkina Faso to improve its human 
capital and workforce productivity in specific areas.  This might indeed be a good short 
term strategy given the ideas presented by Bonnel (2000), that HIV/AIDS causes 
decreased economic growth, which in turn leads to higher levels of HIV/AIDS and so on.  
Targeting workers in key industries could lead to higher growth, which could reverse this 
cycle.  In essence, it may be most efficient for Burkina Faso to utilize its HIPC resources 
earmarked for HIV/AIDS spending to protect the productivity and viability of the 
industries that it has designated as keys to economic growth.    
 On a more general scale, while Burkina Faso acknowledges the human capital 
effects associated with HIV/AIDS, it seems to underestimate the overall impact that 
HIV/AIDS has on human capital.  For example, the PRSP estimates that there are 
350,000 orphans due to HIV/AIDS in Burkina Faso.  However, there is no mention of the 
impact of such a situation on human capital as discussed by Hamoudi and Birdsall 
(2004).  In fact there is not even a mention of the economic consequences of such a high 
number of orphans.  This example is indicative of Burkina Faso’s lack of action to outline 
specific actions targeted at offsetting the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on human capital 
development.   
Perhaps correctly so, Burkina Faso’s strategy for developing its weak human 
capital relies heavily on education and not on reversing the ill effects of HIV/AIDS on 
human capital.  This fact is evidenced by the figures presented in Table 8.  Education 
receives 25% of HIPC resources annually as compared to 1.5% received by HIV/AIDS. 
With primary enrollment rates around 50% and a literacy rate of only 21.8 percent in 
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2003, the educational system in Burkina Faso clearly needs to be strengthened in order to 
improve human capital development.  As such, the PRSP prioritizes education and has 
dedicated nearly a quarter of its HIPC resources towards education. 
 Placing priority on education as a means to develop human capital is not a bad 
strategy.  Nevertheless, such a strategy should at least acknowledge the notion behind the 
evidence presented by Hamoudi and Birdsall (2004) that a 10 year decrease in life 
expectancy will lead to a decrease of investment in education by .8 to 1.3 years and by 
Bonnel (2000) who finds the HIV prevalence rate to be a significant variable in 
explaining the decline in secondary school enrollment.  The PRSP does not mention at 
all, however, the negative impacts of HIV/AIDS on education.  This omission is even 
more glaring in light of the fact that Burkina Faso acknowledges that enrollment rates are 
lower than expected and educational infrastructure is underused, but does not offer 
HIV/AIDS as a potential explanation.  Furthermore, human capital development is listed 
as one of Burkina Faso’s 11 guiding principles for poverty reduction.  However, the 
PRSP indicates that human capital development will be achieved solely through 
educational attainment, and that mitigating the impacts of HIV/AIDS or ill health in 
general does not seem to be important.  While the increased spending on education may 
lead to productivity gains that offset the productivity losses associated with HIV/AIDS, 
such a narrow focus is not the most efficient use of resources. 
 Cuddington and Hancock (1994) amongst others, recognize that government 
savings may be depleted by increased health care costs associated with HIV/AIDS, 
thereby reducing the value of K in the production function:  
As Table 8 indicates, roughly 23.5% of HIPC resources go towards health.  This could be 
an indicator that Burkina Faso has been able to use resources freed up from debt relief 
instead of savings in order to finance health care expenditures.  If this is the case, then 
capital expenditures should increase, as logically speaking increased saving leads to 
increased investment.   
Table 9: Government Capital Expenditures (in billions of CFA Francs) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 Est. 2004 Proj. 2005 Proj. 2006 Proj. 
Capital 
Expenditures 
239.1 252 224.6 300.9 350.8 387.7 
Source: PRSP of Burkina Faso, 2004 
Y = ALe
βK1−β
 35
As Table 9 indicates, there is a significant increase in capital expenditures.  While there 
may not be a direct causal relationship between debt relief and increased capital 
expenditure, the implication is that at the very least HIV/AIDS related health care 
expenditures do not seem to be hindering capital expenditure expansion. 
 While using HIPC resources to increase health expenditures may ease the fiscal 
burden that Burkina Faso faces, there are potential efficiency losses associated in 
devoting such a significant portion of HIPC resources towards health mainly due to 
corruption in the health sector.  The Burkinabé NGO REN-LAC (Reseau National de 
Lutte Anti Corruption “National Network for the Fight Against Corruption”), places the 
health sector as one of the sectors worst hit by corruption in Burkina Faso.  In a poll, 
more than 50% of respondents had experienced corruption in the health sector.  What is 
more, corruption in the health sector got progressively worse from 2000 to 2003 (REN-
LAC, 2003).  Therefore, dedicating a significant amount of resources towards a sector 
that is particularly corrupt could potentially lead to some of these funds being diverted 
from their rightful causes, and thus an efficiency loss.  On the other hand, devoting 
additional resources towards health care could lead to efficiency gains if the resources are 
used properly.  REN-LAC indicates that the corruption in the health care industry is due 
in large part to poor wages, a lack of necessary equipment, and inadequate training of 
medical personnel.  Devoting the HIPC resources spent on the health sector towards 
higher wages and better training and equipment for medical personnel could improve 
efficiency in the health care system. 
Despite the fact that Burkina Faso may not be engineering its HIV/AIDS strategy 
in a fashion that is most efficient for growth, it seems to be nonetheless making some 
progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The epidemic seems to have at least leveled off, 
and according to the government is in decline.  There are bound to be positive 
externalities associated with this drop in prevalence rate.  The effect, however, of this 
decline in prevalence on growth is not likely to appear for a number of years as the 
consequences of high levels of prevalence in past years are likely only beginning to make 
an economic impact.   
In conclusion a summary of the findings of the case study is presented. Statements 
such as a “ twofold and threefold increase in the death rates for workers, managers, and 
public-service and private sector employees will drive up labor costs and diminish the 
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quantity of services provided” are typical of the PRSP of Burkina Faso.  Burkina Faso 
recognizes the economic impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic but does not harmonize its 
strategy to fight HIV/AIDS and its strategy to promote economic growth.  It fails to do so 
by i) devoting a large portion of HIPC resources towards education and relying solely on 
education as a means to develop human capital and not accounting for the negative 
impact of HIV/AIDS on educational attainment, ii) inefficient structuring of its 
HIV/AIDS strategy by not focusing strategy on protecting the workforces of industries 
that are key to economic growth.  Nonetheless some gains have been made in reducing 
prevalence rate, which is bound to help future growth. 
IV.2 Ghana 
The PRSP prepared by Ghana, heretofore referred to by its more common and 
specific name, GPRS (Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy), is a document that recognizes 
the importance of HIV/AIDS as an impediment to economic growth and poverty 
reduction.  Moreover, the GPRS makes several key realizations about the dynamic of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ghana and the potential negative economic impacts of such a 
dynamic.  These negative impacts are all recognized to have an impact on productivity 
and human capital.  Specifically the GPRS mentions that the epidemic can result in the 
deaths of young people during their most productive years which will hurt the ability of 
households to support themselves, that it can result in the loss of agricultural laborers due 
to HIV/AIDS related deaths, and that the epidemic carries with it the potential for the loss 
of skilled manpower in industry.  The GPRS reaches some important conclusions 
regarding these last two points.  First of all, it notes that a reduction in the size of the 
agricultural labor force will not only lead to decreased agricultural production, it will 
change what the agricultural sector grows.  The GPRS suggests that a decreased 
agricultural labor force will result in a shift of production from export crops to food 
crops.  This would be a step backwards from an agricultural sector geared towards crops 
that would bolster economic growth to a sector that is based on subsistence.  Secondly, 
the GPRS recognizes not only the potential productivity losses in industry associated with 
the deaths of skilled workers, but also the high costs of training replacements and paying 
the health bills of workers infected with HIV/AIDS.  Thus, the GPRS seems to have an 
understanding of the complex issues surrounding the economic impact of HIV/AIDS.  
The impact on both agriculture and industry occurs in more than one time period.  There 
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is the initial loss of productivity associated with the deaths of workers, followed later on 
by other impacts resulting from these deaths.  
The GPRS displays its understanding of the complex issues surrounding the 
economic impact of HIV/AIDS by noting the impact of the epidemic on the familial 
social safety net.  The GPRS recognizes not only that the deaths of heads of households 
result in the loss of income, but also that such deaths result in the depletion of family 
savings and assets, as well as increased numbers of orphans and declining school 
enrollment.  The last realization is vital, as it recognizes the potential human capital 
affects associated with declining school enrollment.   
IV.2.2 Ghana’s Strategy to fight HIV/AIDS 
 The GPRS notes that the prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in Ghana has not declined 
as desired but has remained more or less unchanged at around 3.6%.  The GPRS views 
this as a reflection of a lack of attitudinal change amongst Ghanaians and limited gains in 
achieving behavior changes that would help stop the spread of HIV/AIDS.  
Consequently, the GPRS strives for a renewed and bolstered effort at HIV/AIDS 
prevention and cites the low cost of prevention relative to treatment as further 
justification for its focus on prevention.  Nevertheless, the GPRS does not focus entirely 
on prevention efforts and acknowledges the need to provide treatment to those living with 
HIV/AIDS and their families.   
 Ghana believes that increased spending and a greater capacity to respond to 
HIV/AIDS are vital.  The GPRS therefore advocates an expanded multi sector response 
both at the national and local level that involves not only the government but also the 
private sector, NGOs, unions, religious leaders, traditional leaders, the media and other 
civil society and community organizations.  This multi sector approach is perhaps an 
admission of the fact that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has reached a level such that the 
government alone cannot effectively handle the situation.  Furthermore, such an approach 
not only releases some of the burden placed on the government, it has proven to be 
effective.  Specifically, the involvement of tribal, local and religious leaders has been 
demonstrated as important in reducing the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and creating 
important behavioral changes that lower the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Allen and Heald, 
2004).  
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 Ghana’s strategy to cope with HIV/AIDS, as presented in the GPRS, prioritizes 
three objectives: preventing new transmission of HIV, provision of a continuum of care 
for people living with HIV/AIDS and their families, and laying an effective institutional 
framework.  In terms of preventing new transmissions of HIV the GPRS plans to focus 
on improved service delivery, intensifying behavioral change communication and 
organizing special programs for high-risk groups.  The emphasis placed on behavioral 
change is quite interesting, as it indicates that Ghana views behavioral change as vital to 
helping prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.  Furthermore, the GPRS views not only 
schools, but also the workplace, employers, and unions as important communicators of 
the behavioral change message.  This targeting of the workforce can be viewed as an 
effort at guarding the productive capacity of the workforce from the ill effects of 
HIV/AIDS.       
IV.2.3 Ghana’s Economic situation and growth strategy 
Generally speaking, the economic situation in Ghana is better than that of 
neighboring Burkina Faso.  According to a report from the OECD Development Center 
Ghana has, in recent years, experienced, “steady if unspectacular economic growth and 
lower inflation,” (OECD, 2005).  Furthermore, in terms of social indicators, Ghana does 
relatively well in comparison with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2003).  
Although the economy depends primarily on cocoa and a few other products, Ghana 
would like to diversify its economy and has already made progress in doing so.  Perhaps 
most encouragingly, the OECD report notes that Ghana has benefited not only from 
HIPC debt relief but from sound macroeconomic policies and structural reforms as well.    
As Table 10 indicates, Ghana has been able to achieve steady real GDP growth.   
Table 10: Real GDP Growth for Ghana 
Year Real GDP Growth 
2003 5.2 
2004 5.8 
2005 (projected) 5.9 
2006 (projected) 5.7 
  Source: OECD Development Center, “African Economic Outlook 2004/2005” 
This recent growth trend has been fueled by good agricultural performance and more 
specifically, by better than expected cocoa output.  In 2003, the agricultural sector grew 
at its highest rate in 20 years.  Nevertheless, as the GPRS acknowledges, the reliance of 
the Ghanaian economy on cocoa and a few other products leaves the economy in a fragile 
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position and makes it quite susceptible to price fluctuations as well as a variety of other 
shocks.   Furthermore, the growth in cocoa production is somewhat misleading, as much 
of the increased output owes itself not to better productivity, but to more acreage devoted 
to farming cocoa (OECD, 2005).  This means that Ghana must focus on increasing 
productivity if it wishes to continue its strong cocoa output.   
 The GPRS acknowledges the dangers associated with an economy based on a few 
primary agricultural products, and it engineers its strategy for growth around the need for 
diversification.  The main goal as stated by the GPRS is “to ensure sustainable equitable 
growth, accelerated poverty reduction, and the protection of the vulnerable and the 
excluded within a decentralized democratic environment” (Ghana, 2003).  In order to 
achieve sustainable economic growth, the GPRS focuses on the development of the 
agricultural and rural sector as “the catalyst for the transformation of the national 
economy and the drive to economic maturity.”  The GPRS recognizes that there is an 
underutilization of human and physical resources in the rural sector.  Government 
intervention is necessary in order to restructure and develop the rural agricultural sector 
as well as to create entrepreneurial opportunities for agricultural development.  The 
GPRS suggests that “the transformation of the rural environment from its subsistence 
orientation to a commercially attractive, viable and dynamic sector” is crucial for the 
country’s sustained economic growth.   
 This transformation of the agricultural sector is linked with Ghana’s overall 
assessment that it needs to industrialize.  Although Ghana has made progress in industrial 
growth, its industrial sector, like its agricultural sector, is based on a few sub-sectors 
including petroleum and oil refining (OECD, 2005).  Therefore, the GPRS recognizes the 
need to diversify its industry.  The GPRS takes a prudent approach to the industrialization 
of the national economy by beginning its industrialization in its strongest sector, the 
agricultural sector.  Thus, agro-industrial projects are viewed as the first step towards a 
greater and more diverse industrialization of the economy.  Agro-industrial enterprises, 
including the processing of agricultural products, are viewed as the key to making the 
agricultural sector, and the economy as a whole more dynamic.  Such prioritization of 
agro-industry, is likely to require increased investment in capital and technology.   
 In brief, although Ghana’s economic performance has been relatively sound in 
recent years, this has been attributable to some degree to positive shocks, including 
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favorable weather conditions.  The GPRS acknowledges that this is the nature of the 
Ghanaian economy and seeks to reduce the potential for such shocks to determine the fate 
of the economy.  In order to do so, the GPRS calls for diversification of the economy, 
with the structural reform of the agricultural sector viewed as the key for economic 
growth.  The GPRS prioritizes industrialization led by agro-industrial projects as 
important for economic growth. 
 While a strategy that builds itself around the strongest element of the Ghanaian 
economy is sound, there are a few shortcomings of the GPRS in terms of its plan to 
achieve economic growth.  First, the government passes the buck on the increased capital 
expenditures and new technology that are needed for such a plan.  While it acknowledges 
the need for new capital and technology for its agro-industrial projects, it suggests that 
foreign direct investment and foreign firms will provide such capital and technology.  It 
is perhaps overly optimistic to assume that such investment will materialize.  Secondly, 
Ghana has a tremendous comparative advantage given that it is a country with a 
coastline.  Opportunities for shipping, fishing and other marine industries would seem to 
logically play an important role in Ghana’s strategy for economic growth.  However, the 
GPRS makes little mention of how to exploit its coastal position.  Finally, the GPRS is 
relatively short sighted.  It lays out only a 3-5 year framework and does not have a long-
term vision (World Bank, 2005).     
IV.2.4 HIV/AIDS strategy in the context of Ghana’s growth strategy 
The GPRS misses a great opportunity to integrate its HIV/AIDS strategy into its 
strategy for economic growth in a debt relief context.  As noted earlier, the GPRS 
understands the complicated economic problems associated with HIV/AIDS, including 
changes in labor force composition and potential shifts in the composition of agricultural 
output.  However, while the GPRS seems to have a firm grasp on the complex economic 
ramifications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic as discussed in the relevant literature, it does 
not take the next step to fully address these issues.  For example, the GPRS cites the 
potential negative impact of the epidemic on both the agricultural and industrial sectors, 
both of which are crucial to the growth of the Ghanaian economy.  However, the strategy 
to fight HIV/AIDS as presented in the GPRS simply does not address these sectors 
specifically.  Moreover, the GPRS treats the whole HIV/AIDS epidemic in a seemingly 
vague fashion.  In essence, it is quite difficult to separate the goals of the GPRS with 
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regards to HIV/AIDS from the overall health related goals.  As evidence of this fact, the 
GPRS does not specifically earmark funds made available from the HIPC to go towards 
HIV/AIDS programs.  This is quite demonstrative of the overly neglectful manner in 
which HIV/AIDS is treated by the GPRS.  In essence, again keeping in mind the Cobb-
Douglas production function put forth by Cuddington and Hancock (1994), Ghana 
encounters much of the same problem as Burkina Faso.  Both Burkina Faso and Ghana 
recognize the detrimental effect of HIV/AIDS crisis on their labor forces, but they do not 
do enough to address the problem in key economic sectors. 
Perhaps the most glaring missed opportunity on the part of Ghana is its failure to 
specifically earmark HIPC funds for HIV/AIDS expenditures.  While the GPRS outlines 
increased social expenditures by sector, it does not indicate how much of these 
expenditures will be financed by HIPC savings.  In fact, nowhere does the GPRS indicate 
in a clear and organized fashion how it plans to disburse funds made available from debt 
relief.  Only one thing is clear from GPRS: the government plans to use 20% of annual 
HIPC relief to pay down domestic debt, and dedicate the remaining 80% to poverty 
reducing expenditures.  Fortunately, the annual government budget reports provide better 
information as to how Ghana plans to use its HIPC resources.  Table 11 gives a snapshot 
for the breakdown of Ghana’s HIPC expenditures for the year 2004.  It is important to 
keep in mind that these expenditures represent only 80% of resources made available 
from HIPC relief. 
  Table 11: HIPC expenditures, 2004 
Sector Percentage of HIPC resources allocated 
Human Resource Development 46% 
Educational Programs, Activities and 
Infrastructure 
23.5% 
Health  10.6% 
Access to Potable Water 4.7% 
Other 7.2% 
Private Sector Development 40% 
Rural Electrification Programs 13.6% 
Roads and Transport 6.1% 
Agricultural Machinery 4.3% 
Farmer Subsidies 3.6% 
Other 12.4% 
Governance 8.5% 
Other 5.5% 
Compiled from Information in Government of Ghana’s 2005 Budget Statement 
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A few things are worth noting taking this table into account.  First, Ghana does 
not clearly earmark any HIPC funds for HIV/AIDS.  This is something viewed as 
important for helping growth in the context of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative (UNAIDS 
and the World Bank, 2001).  Thus, this failure to earmark funds represents a missed 
opportunity for Ghana.  Secondly, health, the area under which HIV/AIDS treatment 
presumably falls, receives a comparatively small fraction of the total resources freed up 
by the HIPC Initiative.  With health receiving 10.6% of HIPC resources, it appears to be 
less of a priority than even rural electrification programs.  Finally, in terms of human 
resource development, education is far greater a priority than health.  This is perhaps a 
reflection of a belief that lack of education is much more of an impediment to human 
capital development than poor health.  In essence, it can be inferred from this spending 
pattern that lack of education hurts productivity more so than poor health. 
Perhaps Ghana’s decision to use only 10.6% of HIPC resources for expenditures 
on health, and consequently an even lower though indeterminable portion for HIV/AIDS, 
can be explained by their strategy to combat HIV/AIDS as outlined in GPRS.  This 
strategy is one that seeks low cost and efficient solutions.  The GPRS takes into account 
the opportunity costs of treatments.  In deciding to pursue prevention as its primary 
means of coping with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it explicitly states, “prevention is key to 
achieving sustainable poverty reduction, given the low costs relative to treatment.”   
Thus, in terms of human capital, Ghana’s HIV/AIDS strategy is an interesting one. The 
strategy does not appear to tailor itself towards the needs of the economy, taking into 
account what policies should be pursued to make the economy most viable.  The GPRS 
seems to look for simply the cheapest way to deal with the epidemic.   
In this context, the emphasis placed on behavioral change strategy as the best way 
to prevent new infections is interesting.  While this strategy has been proven to be 
effective, it also is likely the cheapest route to take towards prevention relative to the 
other prevention strategies presented in the GPRS.  If Ghana is able to achieve its goals 
of prevention largely through behavioral change, then its strategy to combat HIV/AIDS 
as outlined in the GPRS will have worked in an incredibly efficient and cost effective 
manner.   
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Nevertheless, even the earmarking done by Ghana creates some problems.  First, 
as Table 11 indicates, there are significant percentages of HIPC resources that are not 
designated for some explicit purpose.  This certainly does not lend itself well to the 
complete and full accountability and transparency that is viewed as essential for the 
disbursement of HIPC resources (UNAIDS and World Bank, 2001).  In essence, failure 
to explicitly earmark all HIPC resources seems to lend itself to opportunities for 
corruption and other misuse of the funds. 
Furthermore, a report by the Ghana AIDS Commission reveals Ghana loses 
efficiency not only by failing to mark HIPC funds for HIV/AIDS, but in the general way 
in which it targets all of its resources in the fight against HIV/AIDS.   
Table 12: How Ghana Targets its HIV/AIDS expenditures 
Target Group Percent of Total HIV/AIDS 
expenditures, 2003 
Non targeted 57.8 
School Children 6.1 
Workers 7.3 
Commercial Sex Workers .2 
Child in risk of vertical transmission 0 
Blood Donors .2 
Migrant Workers .1 
Uniformed Population .2 
Prison Inmates .2 
Pregnant Women .2 
Children and youth in social risk 1.0 
Health Facilities Staff 9.3 
People living with HIV .2 
People living with AIDS 17.1 
Source: Ghana AIDS Commission 
As table 12 indicates, 57.8 % of all of the resources that Ghana spends on HIV/AIDS are 
not targeted for any specific population or group.  This is dreadfully inefficient, 
especially in light of the fact that Ghana explicitly mentions in the GPRS specific groups 
that would be strongly affected by the epidemic.  While this table represents all of 
Ghana’s expenditures on HIV/AIDS, and not just solely those made available from debt 
relief, it is nevertheless telling.  In essence, this table is most likely a good proxy for how 
Ghana targets its funds for HIV/AIDS made available from debt relief. 
In terms of better allocation of resources, it would clearly be more efficient for 
Ghana to do two things.  First, Ghana should earmark HIPC resources explicitly for the 
purpose of coping with HIV/AIDS.  This would ensure that at least some portion of the 
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resources made available from debt relief would go towards programs that would 
counteract the negative economic impacts of the epidemic.  Secondly, Ghana could best 
serve itself economically by better targeting of its HIV/AIDS expenditures.  The GPRS 
rests on the principle that the rural sector is to act as the key to economic growth in 
Ghana.  Furthermore, the GPRS also notes that inequities exist in the healthcare system.  
The result of these inequities is that those living in urban areas receive far better health 
care than those in rural areas.  Keeping this in mind, it would be more efficient for Ghana 
to target at least some of the untargeted 57.8% of its resources towards those living in 
rural areas and specifically those involved in agriculture and agro-industrial 
entrepreneurial projects.  In other words, in terms of economic growth it would be most 
efficient for Ghana to improve its human capital and workforce productivity in the 
specific areas that are viewed as keys to economic growth.   
As Table 12 indicates, Ghana appears to prioritize education as a recipient of 
HIPC funds.  The GPRS makes it clear that Ghana views education as quite important for 
improving human capital and for improving its workers’ earnings potential.  This is not a 
bad strategy for developing human capital, however it ignores the negative impacts of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic on educational attainment.  Both Hamoudi and Birdsall (2004) and 
Bonnel (2000) discuss the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on investment in education and 
enrollment rates.  Thus, to some degree the negative effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
will offset the positive effects of higher expenditures on education.  In order to maximize 
human capital gains, the GPRS should attempt to account for and rectify the negative 
impacts of HIV/AIDS on educational attainment. 
In conclusion, Ghana understands the complex multi-level and multi time 
problems associated with HIV/AIDS.  The GPRS, however, does not turn this 
understanding into sufficient action.  The GPRS does not take advantage of the 
opportunity that debt relief presents to deal with the negative economic impacts of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ghana.  To summarize, the GPRS suffers from the following 
inefficiencies: i) failure to earmark HIPC resources specifically for HIV/AIDS, ii) 
choosing a strategy to cope with the HIV/AIDS epidemic based more on its low cost than 
anything else, and which does not focus on the areas of the economy deemed most 
essential for economic growth.  In brief, although the GPRS designates HIV/AIDS as a 
cross cutting issue that should be dealt with on a multiple levels and in multiple sectors, it 
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does not appear that this is truly the case.  As a clear example of this, there is no mention 
whatsoever of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and education in the GPRS. 
IV.3.1 Uganda 
As the first country to complete the HIPC Initiative in April 1998 and the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative in 2000, Uganda is the “forerunner” of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper method (Driscoll and Evans, 2005).  In fact, Uganda developed a Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997, before the creation of such a document became 
one of the conditions for debt relief.  In 2005, Uganda published its third PEAP.  This 
third generation PEAP is not drastically different from the first two in terms of its overall 
goals; it merely represents an update and refinement of the strategy. 
Uganda’s 2005 PEAP is a document with great strengths.  The PEAP recognizes  
the great importance of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda and designates HIV/AIDS as 
one of the PEAP’s cross cutting issues.  The PEAP recognizes the potentially grave 
negative economic impacts of the epidemic.  It notes that HIV/AIDS is the leading cause 
of death amongst the most productive 15-49 year old age demographic.  Furthermore, it 
takes note of the economic consequence of HIV/AIDS in specific sectors.  For example, 
it notes the need to not only deal with the impact of HIV/AIDS on the productivity and 
delivery of public services, but also notes that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has had an impact 
on the labor supply in certain regions which has resulted in poor agricultural growth.  To 
this end, the PEAP also recognizes the potential long term economic impact of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in hypothesizing that between 1985 and 2020 Uganda will have lost 
14% of its agricultural labor force due to AIDS.  This clearly leaves the agricultural 
sector below its productive capacity and hurts growth in Uganda.  The PEAP also notes 
that HIV/AIDS constrains investors and thus hampers capital accumulation and the 
growth of industry and services.  
It is in discussing the human capital effects that the PEAP demonstrates how firm 
a grasp Uganda has on the deep and multi-layered economic issues surrounding 
HIV/AIDS.  As the relevant literature (Hamoudi and Birdsall, 2004, Bonnel, 2000) 
suggests, how HIV/AIDS affects human capital is a complex issue.  The PEAP grasps the 
complexities discussed in the literature stating: 
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By killing primarily young adults, AIDS does more than destroy human capital; it 
also deprives their children of the requirements (parents’ care, knowledge, and 
capacity to finance education) to become economically productive adults.  This 
weakening of the mechanism through which human capital is transmitted across 
generations becomes apparent only after a long time lag, it is progressively 
cumulative in its effects (Uganda, 2005).   
 
In recognition of this fact, the PEAP discusses how specifically to offset the human 
capital losses associated with high numbers of AIDS orphans.  Also, in terms of human 
capital, the PEAP notes that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has had an impact on the demand 
for education, which in turn has an effect on human capital. 
Not only does the PEAP devote significant attention to the discussion of the 
relevant economic issues surrounding the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it does a reasonable job 
of integrating these issues into its strategy for growth.  In essence, in terms of economic 
growth, Uganda recognizes the negative impacts of HIV/AIDS on its labor force 
productivity and is trying to at mitigate the impact of household savings depletion by 
offering free HIV/AIDS treatment.  Most importantly, Uganda is able to some degree to 
harmonize its strategy to combat HIV/AIDS with its strategy to achieve economic 
growth.   
IV.3.2 Uganda’s Strategy to Fight HIV/AIDS 
In the early stages of its HIV/AIDS epidemic, Uganda was viewed as one of the 
countries worst affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic with prevalence rates averaging 18% 
in the early 1990s (Uganda AIDS Commission).  Despite its early struggles with the 
epidemic, Uganda is today “held up as the African HIV/AIDS success story” (Parkhurst, 
2005).  There is general agreement (Parkhurst, 2005, Allen and Heald, 2004) that the 
actions of the Ugandan government characterized by an early and active response at the 
highest levels of government and the opening of a national dialogue on HIV/AIDS, 
proved vital in Uganda’s ability to significantly lower its prevalence rate to its current 
level of roughly 4 to 6% depending on the estimate.   
The PEAP seeks to continue the government’s good track record with regards to 
HIV/AIDS policy.  In designating HIV/AIDS as one of its “cross cutting issues” Uganda 
acknowledges that the results of its fight against HIV/AIDS have an impact on multiple 
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levels and across sectors.  The strategy to combat HIV/AIDS as presented in the PEAP 
focuses on prevention, impact mitigation, anti-retroviral drug (ARV) diffusion, and the 
mainstreaming and coordination of AIDS policies.  
In terms of prevention, Uganda emphasizes the importance of education and 
public information.  The PEAP, continuing with the logic adopted by Uganda in the early 
stages of its epidemic, notes that AIDS education helps debunk myths and prejudices 
about the disease and its transmission and helps reduce the social stigma associated with 
it.  The PEAP notes that increased levels of education, not just HIV/AIDS education, 
have been proven to be correlated with better knowledge about behavioral strategies that 
can prevent HIV transmission. 
The section of the PEAP that deals with impact mitigation is quite unique.  This 
section suggests that it is vital for Uganda to deal with the non-health related impact of 
the epidemic.  In other words, the PEAP recognizes that the disease has effects that go 
beyond simple loss of health and life, and part of Uganda’s strategy must be to deal with 
these psychological, social, and economic effects. 
The PEAP places an emphasis on the importance of treatment of those living with 
HIV/AIDS.  In a somewhat revolutionary move, Uganda has decided to provide free 
treatment for HIV/AIDS.  This mainly means that Uganda will provide ARVs free of 
charge to those in need.  This decision represents a strong commitment on the part of 
Uganda to truly focus on serious treatment, and not just on simple palliative measures.  
Uganda acknowledges the risk involved in placing priority on serious treatment of 
HIV/AIDS by providing free ARVs.  It recognizes that such a strategy may not be the 
most cost effective, and that furthermore the financial implications of such a decision are 
not completely clear and understood by the government.   
Finally, Uganda’s strategy to combat HIV/AIDS involves the mainstreaming and 
coordination of AIDS policies.  The PEAP recognizes that the actions necessary to treat 
and prevent HIV/AIDS are the responsibility of all sectors, not just the health sector.  
Following this logic, the PEAP suggests that the actions necessary to deal with the 
epidemic must be included in the human resource and budgetary planning of all sectors.  
The ultimate aim of such mainstreaming is to strengthen the national capacity to cope 
with the HIV/AIDS epidemic on a multi-sector basis. 
IV.3.3 Uganda’s Economic Situation and Growth Strategy 
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The economic situation in Uganda is somewhat remarkable considering its 
history.  In essence, Uganda has emerged quite well from under the dictatorial regime of 
Idi Amin.  According to a recent OECD report, Uganda’s solid macroeconomic policies 
have resulted in consistent growth of around 5 %.  Real GDP grew at 5.2% in 2003, and 
5.9% in 2004.  Moreover, in the past 15 years Uganda has made substantial progress in 
reducing poverty.  The percentage of the population living in poverty dropped from 56% 
in 1992 to 35% in 2000.  Much of this poverty reduction is due to Uganda’s development 
of its PEAP and to increased pro-poor public expenditures due to HIPC relief and to other 
sources of external funds.  Uganda has made tangible gains in terms of poverty reduction 
since joining the HIPC Initiative.  For example, gross primary enrollment shot up from 
2.6 million students in 1997 to 7.3 million in 2002. 
 Despite its consistent growth and gains in terms of poverty reduction, 
there is still much to be achieved in Uganda.  Tables 13 and 14, reproduced from a report 
on the Ugandan budget for 2005-2006, show sector contribution to GDP and sector GDP 
growth rates by sector, respectively. 
Table 13: Sector Contribution to GDP 
Sector 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Agriculture 40.8% 39.9% 39.0% 37.6% 36.3% 
Industry 18.6% 18.9% 19.3% 19.7% 20.4% 
Service 40.6% 41.2% 41.7% 42.7% 43.3% 
Source: Government of Uganda, “Background to the Budget For Financial year 2005/06.” 
 
Table 14: Annual Real GDP Growth Rates by Sector 
Real GDP 
Growth 
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Agriculture 4.6% 3.9% 2.3% 1.6% 2.1% 
Industry 6.0% 8.2% 6.7% 8.1% 9.1% 
Services 5.2% 8.2% 5.7% 8.1% 7.2% 
Source: Government of Uganda, “Background to the Budget For Financial year 2005/06.” 
These tables are quite striking and highlight a shift in the Ugandan economy 
discussed in its PEAP.  There is a notable shift in the structure of Uganda’s economy, 
with agriculture making up 40.8% of GDP in 2000/2001 and only 36.3% in 2004/2005.  
The shift is even more striking as the PEAP notes that agriculture accounted for 51% of 
GDP in 1992.  Moreover, subsistence agriculture’s contribution to GDP dropped by 10% 
from 1992 to 2002.  As should be expected, the change in sector contribution to GDP was 
accompanied by a change in the labor force.  The PEAP notes that between 2000 and 
2003, the proportion of households employed in agriculture dropped from 71% to 58%, 
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while the self-employed outside of agriculture jumped from 12% to 25%.  Nevertheless, 
agriculture in Uganda remains highly labor intensive, and the government would like to 
increase agricultural productivity in order to free up labor to be used in other areas of the 
economy.   
While Uganda is in the midst of a shift away from agriculture, its agricultural 
sector still relies on a few main export products, namely coffee, fish, tea and cotton.  This 
reliance on a few products leaves Uganda vulnerable to shocks, and to volatile world 
market prices.   
It is the ultimate goal of Uganda’s PEAP to help transform Uganda into a middle-
income country.  In the short run, the government wants to strengthen both 
manufacturing and agriculture as a means to foster balanced growth.  Over the medium 
term, the strategy aims to boost growth by amongst other things, removing bureaucratic 
barriers to investment, improving transport infrastructure and utility services, 
modernizing and commercializing agriculture, enhancing environmental stability, and 
continuing to focus on HIV prevalence reduction and mitigating the impact of 
HIV/AIDS.  This last point is quite important as it indicates how integral a role Uganda 
feels HIV/AIDS plays in issues of economic growth.  In order to fully pursue these goals, 
the strategy focuses on a few critical objectives.  It seeks to further develop and 
restructure the agriculture sector, industrialize, build human capital and improve 
workforce productivity, and ensure that public expenditures are used both transparently 
and efficiently. 
The PEAP considers the further development and restructuring of the agricultural 
sector as critical.  Not only does the sector provide the majority of employment, but also 
increasing agricultural incomes are seen as necessary to expand non-agricultural rural 
production.  Furthermore, the PEAP aims to capitalize on Uganda’s geographic location 
and resources to pursue agro-industrialization and the processing of agricultural products 
as a way to make the agricultural sector more productive and more profitable.    
The PEAP suggests that agro-industrialization will be one of the primary forms of 
industrialization, however, this is not the sole form of industrialization that Uganda hopes 
to pursue.  Diverse industrialization in order to foster growth that will help steer Uganda 
towards middle-income status will require increased private investment.  The PEAP 
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implies that Uganda may be obtaining the necessary private investment, as private 
investment tripled between 1990/1991 and 2002/2003. 
In recognition of the fact that Uganda has had a high growth in its labor force, 
comprised largely of workers with low levels of education, the PEAP prioritizes 
education and human capital development as a means to improve worker productivity.  
The PEAP aims to take measures such as providing sufficient financing for technical and 
vocational schools as a means to create a more highly productive workforce that earns 
higher wages and can increase the competitiveness of the products of the Ugandan 
economy.   
Finally, the PEAP suggests that part of Uganda’s strategy to achieve growth 
requires the transparent and efficient use of public expenditures.  To this end, Uganda has 
created the Poverty Action Fund (PAF), a virtual fund within its own budget.  Savings 
from HIPC debt relief, government revenue and other donor funds finance the PAF.  It is 
a mechanism by which Uganda can ensure that resources go towards poverty reducing 
expenditures.  This type of transparency reduces the chance for corruption, and allows for 
efficient disbursement of HIPC funds.  Uganda’s PAF has been effective at achieving its 
goals and channeling the appropriate funds to the appropriate places (Williamson and 
Canagarajah, 2003). 
In brief, Uganda has an ambitious goal of achieving middle-income status, and 
has tailored its strategy for growth with this objective in mind.  As outlined in its PEAP, 
Uganda’s plan focuses on the continued transformation of its agricultural sector, 
industrialization, human capital development, and accountability for its pro-poor 
expenditures.  Such a strategy aims at achieving middle-income status in an efficient and 
reasonable fashion. 
IV.3.4 HIV/AIDS strategy in context of Uganda’s growth strategy 
In brief, Uganda’s PEAP recognizes the complex economic implications of its 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and more specifically the potential impact of such an epidemic on 
the growth prospects for the Ugandan economy.  In fact there is a special section of the 
PEAP dedicated entirely to the mitigation of the economic impact of the epidemic.  
Moreover, with its emphasis on addressing the economic challenges posed by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic across multiple sectors and levels, the PEAP does a good job in 
harmonizing its strategy to combat HIV/AIDS with its strategy for growth and poverty 
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reduction.  The result is an efficient use of HIPC resources to combat HIV/AIDS and 
promote growth.  The PEAP achieves such harmony by: i) directing all HIPC resources 
into the PAF, ii) demonstrating an understanding of the complex human capital issues 
associated with HIV/AIDS and dealing with them effectively, iii) offering free treatment 
of HIV/AIDS, iv) acknowledging the need to focus HIV/AIDS treatment on specific 
sectors of the economy.   
In 1997, Uganda paid $9 per capita annually on debt service and spent only $3 per 
capita on health, and furthermore a study cited by Mijumbi (2001) suggests that resources 
dedicated towards servicing Uganda’s debt crowded out investment.  With its completion 
of the HIPC Initiative, Uganda has received and will continue to receive significant debt 
relief.  Clear designation of these resources towards specific purposes is viewed as 
important in order to achieve growth in the most efficient manner (UNAIDS and the 
World Bank, 2001).  By diverting all of its HIPC resources into the PAF, Uganda is able 
to ensure that all of its HIPC resources will be earmarked for appropriate pro-poor 
expenditures outlined in the PEAP.  Furthermore, Uganda is able to combine its debt 
relief funds with other sources as the PAF is funded not only by resources made available 
from debt relief, but from government revenue and other donor aid as well.  This type of 
combination allows for greater efficiency as HIPC resources are integrated with other 
resources, providing a larger pool of funds from which more ambitious projects are likely 
to be funded.  Moreover, as Williamson and Canagarajah (2003) note, not only does the 
PAF ensure that debt relief funds are channeled to specific PEAP programs, the creation 
of the PAF has mobilized additional resources from donors.  In other words, donors are 
more willing to give to Uganda as the PAF helps reassure them that their contributions 
will be used for their intended uses.  
Tables 15 and 16 adapted from a report by USAID show the sources of PAF 
funding and the uses of the fund respectively.   
Table 15: Sources of PAF Funds (In billions of Ugandan shillings) 
 
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
HIPC 
Resources 
--- 44.64 63.00 139.82 153.28 155.11 
Government 
Revenues 
141.57 153.97 144.6 162.33 231.86 294.97 
Donor 
Budget 
Support 
--- 33.76 94.78 141.07 138.96 171.38 
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Total PAF 
Resources 
141.57 232.37 302.38 452.55 524.10 621.46 
HIPC as % 
of PAF 
Resources 
0.0% 19.2% 20.8% 30.9% 29.3% 25.0% 
Source: USAID “Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund (PAF):Sources of Resources, Including HIPC, and 
The Programming of Those Resources” 
Table 16: Poverty Action Fund Expenditures 
PAF expenditures under 
PEAP 
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Rural Roads 8.42 20.18 24.59 30.46 32.88 35.52
Implementation of the 
land act 
--- --- 3.00 3.00 6.50 10.00
Agricultural extension 0.54 0.21 4.32 7.99 8.71 9.59
Micro-finance/Restocking 
program 
0.47 0.49 7.29 10.35 13.30 14.97
Primary health care 4.35 20.76 21.07 60.04 80.76 120.08
Water & sanitation 3.86 12.34 17.43 35.56 39.40 41.43
Primary education 120.23 169.83 211.35 275.00 290.58 322.96
Adult literacy --- --- --- 1.50 4.00 6.00
Reduction of court case 
backlog 
--- 0.87 0.50 1.00 1.05 1.10
Wetlands protection --- --- --- 0.30 0.33 0.36
Studies/pilot projects for 
the PEAP 
--- --- --- 1.00 6.00 12.92
Equalization grants --- --- 2.00 4.00 4.40 4.84
PMA grant for LC3 --- --- --- 6.70 7.37 8.17
Dutch district 
development grant 
--- --- 2.00 17.33 18.81 20.29
Key accountability 
institutions 
3.70 4.99 6.90 7.11 7.80 9.11
M & E of PAF program --- 2.69 3.93 11.34 12.65 15.28
Grand Total of PAF 
expenditures 
141.57 232.27 302.38 461.98 522.78 619.61
As % of total 
government Budget 
17% 24% 25% 30% 31% 33%
Source: USAID “Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund (PAF):Sources of Resources, Including HIPC, and 
The Programming of Those Resources” 
As these tables indicate, Uganda is using its HIPC resources in an efficient manner.  
Uganda uses the HIPC resources to contribute to the PAF and they HIPC provide a 
significant portion of the funds for the PAF.  Furthermore, as Table 16 indicates, the PAF 
has been able to increase both its total expenditures and its share of the total government 
budget since its inception in 1997.  This means that an increasing portion of the 
government’s budget is going towards poverty reducing expenditures as outlined in its 
PEAP.  No doubt, resources made available from debt relief have contributed to this ever 
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increasing level of pro-poor expenditure.  The contribution of HIPC resources is most 
striking when comparing expenditures from 1997/98 to 1998/99 in Table 16.  
Expenditures jumped significantly in many areas due to debt relief.  For example, 
primary health care expenditures jumped from 4.35 to 20.76 billion Ugandan shillings.   
 Table 16 indicates that expenditures on primary education financed by the PAF 
dwarf any other type of expenditure.  This means that Uganda is relying on education to 
build its human capital.  This is quite consistent with the strategy outlined in Uganda’s 
PEAP.   
 Such a strategy to build human capital would be incomplete if Uganda failed to 
recognize and address the ill effects of HIV/AIDS on education as the PRSP of Burkina 
Faso fails to do.  Uganda, however, demonstrates an understanding of the complex 
problems that the epidemic poses for human capital and worker productivity.   
 In essence, in terms of human capital development, the PEAP is efficient because 
it recognizes that there is an important relationship between human capital development, 
education and HIV/AIDS.  It recognizes that primary education could reduce the 
economic impact of HIV/AIDS.  It suggests that if universal primary education were 
implemented, 700,000 new cases of HIV/AIDS would be prevented each year.  Thus, 
Uganda’s strategy to spend a large portion of its PAF funds appears quite wise and serves 
a double purpose.  Not only will it develop human capital by providing education, but it 
will simultaneously offset the economic impact of HIV/AIDS not only by avoiding 
medical expenditures associated with 700,000 cases of HIV/AIDS but preserving the 
human capital potential of 700,000 people per year.  Furthermore, the PEAP recognizes 
that effects on enrollment and demand for education as pointed to by Hamoudi and 
Birdsall (2004) and Bonnel (2000).  The PEAP recognizes that the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
has had a negative impact on the demand for education and pledges to work to address 
this issue.  Finally, the PEAP recognizes the significant problems that HIV/AIDS orphans 
pose to human capital development.  According to estimates, one in four Ugandan 
families hosts an AIDS orphan (Deininger, Commelynck and Kempaka, 2005).  In 
recognition of the negative economic impacts associated with HIV/AIDS orphans, the 
PEAP states that making sure these orphans obtain education is vital.  In brief, the PEAP 
of Uganda efficiently addresses the human capital problems posed by low levels of 
education and HIV/AIDS by treating them not as two separate issues, but as one 
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connected issue.  While increased spending on education and increased spending on 
HIV/AIDS independently of one another are both ways to improve human capital and 
worker productivity, it is far more efficient to treat them as one interrelated issue as 
Uganda does. 
Uganda’s decision to offer free treatment for those suffering from HIV/AIDS, 
including free ARV treatment is quite important and represents a new phase in Uganda’s 
fight against HIV/AIDS.  The decision presents several difficulties and raises several 
questions for the government of Uganda.  First, the free provision of ARVs is not 
something that can be done haphazardly.  Currently, only around 6% of those in need of 
ARV treatment in Uganda are receiving it.  Secondly, as the PEAP notes, those placed on 
ARVs must be closely monitored to ensure that they are adhering to their ARV regime.  
Failure to do so could lead the virus becoming resistant to the drugs.  Thus, in order to 
provide ARVs to all of those in need, and to closely monitor those taking ARVs, the 
capacity of the health care system in Uganda needs to be significantly increased.  This 
involves strengthening the infrastructure of the system, and training many more health 
care workers.   
The aim of such free provision is to reduce the cost burden of HIV/AIDS 
treatment at the household level.  The PEAP notes that out of pocket expenditures on 
HIV/AIDS treatment crowd out other expenditures on things such as food, education and 
shelter.  Nevertheless, in offering free ARV treatment the government is simply shifting 
the cost burden from the household to the national level, and the economic implications 
of such a strategy are uncertain.  Surely, there will be high costs associated with the 
expansion and strengthening of the health care system necessary to provide free ARV 
treatment for all in need.  Furthermore, the PEAP notes that the ultimate costs of such a 
decision are uncertain, and could be quite large if the cost of ARVs does not fall.  Also, 
the PEAP notes that such a strategy may not be the most cost effective and is somewhat 
risky as it may require further donor support, which has yet to be procured.  
While the PEAP acknowledges the importance of many of the issues surrounding 
the free provision of ARVs, there is a set of issues that it does not address.  Logically 
speaking, an announcement that ARV treatment will be provided free of charge may 
create an influx of AIDS “refugees” that could potentially overwhelm Uganda.  In other 
words, people from other neighboring countries as well as Ugandans living abroad who 
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are infected may emigrate to Uganda in order to take advantage of its offer to provide 
free ARV treatment.  While the potential for an overwhelming influx of new AIDS 
patients exists, it is likely not a threat due to the nature of Uganda’s ARV provision 
program.  The provision of ARVs is quite an involved process that requires a multitude of 
services including counseling and close monitoring to ensure that a patient is adhering to 
his or her drug regimen.  As a result, Uganda’s program to provide free ARVs has strict 
eligibility criteria to ensure the drugs are given to the right people.  Furthermore, only 
health facilities that meet specific criteria, including an acceptable level of security to 
prevent drug theft, are allowed to distribute ARVs.  Consequently, there are presently a 
limited number of health centers that can provide ARV treatment.  In brief, simply 
because Uganda has decided to provide ARVs for free does not mean that they are easy 
to acquire.  Thus the incentive to emigrate to Uganda created by free ARV treatment may 
be offset by a disincentive presented by the difficulty to acquire the drugs. 
Despite these uncertainties, the government’s decision to pursue curative health 
measures is a significant one and one which is clearly viewed as important.  It represents 
a commitment to preserving the livelihood and thus the productivity of those suffering 
from HIV/AIDS.  In choosing to pursue comprehensive treatment measures, Uganda is 
choosing to try and preserve the health and productivity of its workforce.  If workers are 
healthier and live longer because they are receiving free ARV treatment, they are likely 
to make a positive contribution to the economic situation in Uganda.  In essence, Uganda 
recognizes the importance of education in preventing new infections, but it does not 
ignore the need to help make its workforce as productive as possible by taking seriously 
its decision on how to treat those living with HIV/AIDS. 
Finally, the PEAP of Uganda recognizes that it can best serve its growth prospects 
by concentrating its treatment for HIV/AIDS on certain sectors of the economy.  The 
PEAP notes that HIV/AIDS affects all sectors of the economy and that specific measures 
need to be taken in the human resource planning of each sector to help address the 
impacts of the epidemic.  Thus, the PEAP succeeds at linking the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
with specific sectors of the economy.  Such a link is necessary to help integrate Uganda’s 
strategy to fight HIV/AIDS into its strategy to achieve sustained economic growth. 
The PEAP of Uganda suggest that developing its rural agricultural sector is 
critical to achieving economic growth.  The PEAP makes specific mention of the need to 
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strengthen its delivery of HIV/AIDS treatment in rural sectors.  While the PEAP does not 
explicitly mention the economic benefits that will come with such a commitment to 
treating HIV/AIDS in the rural sector, the benefits are implicit.  If the rural agriculture 
sector is deemed to be important for economic growth, and if the labor force productivity 
in that sector is hurt by HIV/AIDS, then focusing on providing equal treatment to those in 
rural areas should result in positive economic gains.   
The rural sector is not the only sector that is specifically targeted as an area that 
needs to receive focused attention in terms of HIV/AIDS treatment.  The PEAP mentions 
the need for the effect of HIV/AIDS on public sector productivity to be addressed.  In 
essence, the PEAP sees a loss of productivity and efficiency in public service associated 
with HIV/AIDS.  Since good governance is deemed to be quite important by the PEAP to 
achieve economic growth, such losses in public service efficiency must be addressed.  
The PEAP, however, does not outline a specific strategy as to how to address this issue 
and such a strategy is needed. 
To summarize, the PEAP of Uganda is a document with great strengths and 
potential.   It recognizes the potentially grave negative economic impacts of the epidemic, 
and displays a firm grasp on the complex human capital problems created by the AIDS 
epidemic. The PEAP seeks to continue the government’s good track record with regards 
to HIV/AIDS policy, and makes the additional step of offering free HIV/AIDS treatment 
for all.  Uganda’s strategy for growth takes into full account the shifting nature of the 
Ugandan economy and seeks to capitalize on such shifts.  While by no means perfect or 
free from risk, the PEAP does a relatively good job of integrating its strategy to combat 
HIV/AIDS with its strategy to achieve economic growth.  It achieves such harmony i) 
directing all HIPC resources into the PAF, ii) demonstrating an understanding of the 
complex human capital issues associated with HIV/AIDS and dealing with them 
effectively, iii) offering free treatment of HIV/AIDS, iv) acknowledging the need to focus 
HIV/AIDS treatment on specific sectors of the economy.   
 
V.Conclusions 
Based on the case studies of Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Uganda, a few conclusions 
can be reached and a few suggestions can be made.  First of all, all three countries realize 
the opportunity that HIPC debt relief presents in terms of increased pro-poor 
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expenditures, including HIV/AIDS related expenditures.  All three also recognize the 
wide array of consequences associated with HIV/AIDS.  In essence, coping with the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is viewed by all three as a necessary and important component of 
their overall poverty reduction strategies. 
Secondly, all three countries disburse more resources made available from debt 
relief on education than they do on health.  This implies that these countries assume that 
greater benefits will be reaped from investment in education than from investment in 
healthcare.  Implicit in this decision is perhaps the notion that productivity losses 
associated with lower levels of education are far greater than productivity losses 
associated with ill health, including HIV/AIDS.  Thus, resources from debt relief are seen 
as most efficiently used to achieve economic growth by improving the human capital 
stock through education.  This is not an unwise strategy for two reasons.  First, all 
members of a country’s population could conceivably directly benefit from and take 
advantage of increased expenditures on education.  On the other hand it is likely that only 
those in ill health or those suffering from HIV/AIDS will benefit directly from increased 
health expenditures.  Secondly, HIV/AIDS is a global humanitarian crisis, and 
governments are likely to receive greater external donor funds to help finance their fight 
against HIV/AIDS than to finance their educational projects.  Perhaps in recognition of 
this, more resources made available from debt relief are dedicated to education under the 
assumption that resources will be made available from other sources to fight HIV/AIDS. 
Thirdly, all three PRSP documents understand the negative economic effects of 
HIV/AIDS. All three countries understand that HIV/AIDS is not just a public health 
problem, but has social and economic costs that cut across all sectors.  The level of 
comprehension, however, varies from country to country.  Only Uganda, with a section 
of its PRSP dedicated specifically to offsetting the negative economic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS, truly succeeds at converting its comprehension of the problems into action. 
Given the difficulty of the PRSPs at turning comprehension of the complex 
economic issues surrounding HIV/AIDS into action, a few suggestions can be made as to 
how a country can best utilize the resources made available from HIPC debt relief to 
combat HIV/AIDS and help foster economic growth. 
First, and most importantly, a country should earmark which portion of its debt 
relief funds will go specifically towards HIV/AIDS.  Such explicit designation will help 
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improve overall efficiency by reducing corruption, improving accountability, and making 
sure all resources that are to be dedicated to HIV/AIDS actually go towards that purpose 
and do so in a timely manner.  Furthermore, the specific earmarking of funds can 
potentially lead to further outside donor support for increased poverty reducing 
expenditures, as is the case with Uganda’s PAF.  Based on the successes of Uganda’s 
PAF as discussed by Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004) and Williamson and Canagarajah 
(2003), it may be advisable for countries receiving debt relief to establish a virtual 
poverty fund comparable to Uganda’s PAF.  The combination of debt relief funds with 
other resources creates a greater resource pool for financing not only HIV/AIDS 
expenditures but other pro-poor expenditures as well.   
Secondly, there appears to be a need for countries receiving debt relief to turn 
their comprehension of the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS into greater action.  In 
essence, the PRSPs of HIPC countries should do a better job of harmonizing their 
strategies to fight HIV/AIDS with their strategies for growth.  While Uganda is relatively 
successful at achieving this harmonization, more needs to be done. The PRSPs operate 
under the assumption that growth has a feedback effect on HIV/AIDS.  In other words, in 
the face of economic growth, more resources become available to fight AIDS.  Therefore, 
perhaps the best strategy is to tailor AIDS strategy to growth strategy in the short run, in 
order to create economic growth and the feedback effects associated with such growth. 
For example, if the agricultural sector is deemed to be the most important sector for 
economic growth, the strategy to combat HIV/AIDS should act in recognition of this.  In 
other words, if one sector is viewed as crucial for the growth of the economy, and 
especially if this sector’s growth is perceived to be important for spurring growth in other 
areas, it makes sense to make the workforce in that sector as productive as possible.  
Thus, greater efforts should be made in that sector relative to any other to offset the 
negative impacts of HIV/AIDS.   
In brief, countries receiving debt relief can best help themselves by first devoting 
a specific amount of debt relief resources towards HIV/AIDS expenditures.  Secondly, a 
country can best foster economic growth by using these earmarked resources in areas 
where they are likely to reap the greatest gains in terms of economic growth.  Such a 
process will ensure that debt relief resources will be used as efficiently as possible to both 
combat HIV/AIDS and help achieve economic growth. 
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There are a few points surrounding the issues discussed that merit further 
discussion.  Perhaps most notably is the concern raised by Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004) 
that HIPC resources have led to poverty reductions but not debt sustainability.  This 
needs to be addressed.  Furthermore, a comparative study between the HIPC and non-
HIPC countries facing a similar HIV/AIDS epidemic might provide some insight into 
how countries choose to solve complex allocation problems, and whether debt relief truly 
makes allocation decisions easier.  Finally, some of the topics touched on briefly in this 
paper, including the role that additional donor funding for HIV/AIDS expenditures plays 
into how a country decides to allocate its debt relief resources are important and deserve 
closer attention.   
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